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Introduction and Main Results 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the debate on the 
Beveridge Curve: more specifically, after providing a 
theoretical introduction to the Curve in Chapter I, we focus on 
some empirical points, concerning globalisation and 
technological progress, which the international empirical 
literature has not dealt with closely (Chapter II), and on a level 
analysis which no previous study has dealt with in the Italian 
literature (Chapter III).  
Chapter I centres on the matching approach founding the 
studies on the Beveridge Curve since the late 1970‟s, it also 
mentions the recent production frontier approach and gives a 
look to the possible consequences of the Great Recession on 
the matching process and the Curve. 
The aim of Chapter II is to test the existence of a Beveridge 
Curve analysing the economies of nineteen OECD countries 
from 1980 to 2004, and to investigate whether and how 
technological progress and globalisation affect the 
unemployment-vacancies trade-off. Indeed, in the literature 
concerning the Beveridge Curve, only a few contributions 
(Pissarides, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1994) have examined 
the role of technological progress as a significant shift factor 
for labour market performance. However, there is no unanimity 




would deny that globalisation, that is the growing international 
interdependence in communications, trade, finance, labour 
markets (migration), social systems, is one of fundamental 
socio-economic phenomena of this turn of century. 
Consequently, globalisation is another factor which is expected 
to impact on the Beveridge Curve, but no full-fledged 
estimation has, to the best of our knowledge, ever been carried 
out of this nexus. We can sum up the main results as follows: 
a) we find largely favourable evidence for the existence of a 
OECD Beveridge Curve; b) lagged values of technological 
progress impact positively on unemployment and shift the 
Beveridge Curve outwards, producing evidence in support of 
the creative destruction effect; c) lagged values of the 
globalisation index have a positive impact on unemployment, 
also shifting the Beveridge Curve outwards; d) a critical 
econometric issue, extremely neglected by the previous 
literature, is represented by endogeneity, as shown by tests and 
other kind of evidence. 
Finally, Chapter III focuses on the Italian labour market. There 
are not many studies that have analyzed the Beveridge Curve in 
Italy, likely because of the lack of official data on vacancies. 
Moreover, no previous study has focused specifically on a 
regional level analysis of the Beveridge Curve. Chapter III 




the 1992-2009 period. In particular, the ISAE labour scarcity 
indicator, which is available for all the regions, is used to build 
regional vacancy rates. Like in Destefanis and Fonseca (2007), 
we also investigate the impact on matching efficiency of the 
recent strong development in the number of so-called atypical 
jobs (both part-time and temporary). Differently from these 
authors, as well from most of the previous literature, we allow 
for the role of some direct mismatch indicators. Furthermore, 
drawing inspiration from some studies about other countries, 
we investigate the existence of a significant spatial inter-
dependence between Italian regional labour markets,  trying to 
verify whether externalities by non-resident unemployed 
workers and from job openings in neighbouring regions impact 
on the labour market performance of each region. We find the 
following main results: a) there is no evidence that either 
gender or sectoral mismatch bring about shifts in the territorial 
Curves; b) on the other hand, spillover effects are very strong, 
although further research on their proper specification must be 
yet carried out; c) the Great Recession has a very strong 









Chapter I. The Beveridge Curve: Analytical 
Foundations and Recent Developments 
1.1. Introduction 
Since William Beveridge first highlighted the existence of a 
negative relationship between unemployment and job 
vacancies, the Beveridge Curve has been frequently used to 
sum up the state of the labour market. The efficiency at which 
workers are matched to available jobs is crucial for the duration 
of unemployment spells and the capability of the economy to 
make use of its resources. Due to frictions deriving from 
factors, such as coordination failure, heterogeneities or 
congestion from large numbers, the matching process is 
imperfect. For instance, even if there are unsatisfied vacancies 
around, a mismatch between the skills supplied by workers and 
demanded by employers can prevent the completion of a 
working contract.  
For a fixed matching technology, the Beveridge Curve 
postulates a negative relationship between the unemployment 
rate (u) and the rate of vacancies (v), both rates being measured 
in terms of labour force. It is important to note that we do not 
interpret this relationship in a structural sense as it is not 
derived from optimization behaviour of individuals: indeed, the 
curve shows an empirical correlation arising indirectly from the 




accumulation of human capital etc. (Blanchard and Diamond, 
1989). In periods of rising economic activity, vacancies 
increase; thus, it is easier for the unemployed to find a job and 
this will push unemployment rate down. Likewise, in periods 
of weak activity, vacancies are closed and new workers enter 
the unemployed population. Whereas movements along a 
Beveridge Curve reflect adjustments over the business cycle, 
shifts are usually considered an evidence of structural change. 
In general, the position of the Beveridge Curve in the (u, v) 
space is related to the degree of frictions in the labour market. 
The closer the curve to the origin, the smaller are the frictions 
and the more efficient is the matching function. This chapter 
aims at providing a theoretical introduction to the Beveridge 
Curve and is structured as follows: Section 2 focuses on the 
matching approach founding the studies on the Beveridge 
Curve since the late 1970‟s; in Section 3 we proceed to derive 
the Beveridge Curve following Pissarides (2000); Section 4 
deals in detail with the shifts of the Beveridge Curve; Section 5 
presents the recent production frontier approach, whereas 
Section 6 gives a look to the possible consequences of the 
Great Recession on the matching process and the Curve. 







1.2. The Matching Approach 
A stable negative relationship between unemployment and job 
vacancies was found out by William Beveridge (1944), and 
was called for that reason Beveridge Curve. The first studies on 
the Beveridge Curve did not consider the existence of a 
matching function and aimed at developing a more robust 
equilibrium unemployment theory, due to the high interest in 
the Phillips Curve and the natural unemployment rate theory
1
.  
The appearance of the matching models starting from the late 
1970‟s-early 1980‟s
2
 linked the study of the Beveridge Curve 
to the matching function and yielded new analyses aimed at 
understanding the dynamics of employment and unemployment 
in modern labour markets.  
Matching models are nowadays one of the most important 
theoretical and analytical tools for the study of unemployment 
through the business cycle unemployment, as well as for 
assessing the impact of policy interventions in labour markets. 
Indeed, they seem to empirically succeed in explaining what 
goes on in labour markets (Pissarides, 2000). In empirical 
labour economics the efficiency of labour markets has often 
been analysed through matching functions. The matching 
approach is justified by the awareness that modern labour 
markets are characterized by large flows of workers and jobs 
 
1 See Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958), Holt and David (1966), Hansen (1970). 





(employment inflows and outflows, job positions creation and 
destruction) and mainly aims at deriving an empirically 
realistic equilibrium unemployment theory. The recognition of 
the importance of these flows for unemployment persistence is 
the rationale for the crucial concept of matching models: the 
matching process between job-seeker workers and vacancies 
posted by firms. As search activity by both workers and firms 
is decentralized, not coordinated and takes time and other real 
resources, this process is imperfect, in sense that the worker-
job match is not immediate due to frictions such as search 
externalities, heterogeneities in the skills possessed by workers 
and those required by firms or in the location of jobs and 
workers and in the timing of job creation, imperfect 
information, coordination failures, etc. Particularly important 
are the search externalities, also called congestion externalities: 
a firm posting a new job vacancy yields positive externalities 
for job-seekers, making it is easier to find a job, and negative 
externalities for the other firms, making it is more difficult to 
fill their own vacancies. In this environment, there is 
uncertainty about the possibility that job-seekers find good jobs 
and hiring firms find good workers, and firms and workers 
have to decide whether to take up what is available, wait for a 
better alternative or affect the matching process by spending 
resources on the acquisition of information, retraining 




The matching function provides the outcome of the investment 
of resources by firms and workers in the trading process and is 
a modelling device which captures the implication of the 
trading process without making the heterogeneities and other 
features, that cause the process itself, explicit. The key idea is 
that a complex trading process can be summarized by a well-
behaved function which yields the number of jobs created at 
any moment in time as a function of the number of workers 
looking for a job, the number of firms looking for workers and 
a small number of other variables. In this sense, it is 
conceptually similar to a production function, with unemployed 
and job vacancies as inputs and job matches as the output.  
The interpretation of the matching function as a production 
function is quite common, and a considerable amount of 
research has been devoted to revealing the micro foundations 
of this “black box” (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). In this 
chapter we present a theoretical analysis of the Beveridge 
Curve based on Pissarides matching model (2000). This model 
is very attractive for several reasons, as it provides an 
appealing description of how the labour market works, is 
analytically tractable, has rich and intuitive comparative statics 
and can be easily adapted to study a number of labour market 
policy issues. There are other definitions of the relationship 
between unemployment and vacancies, which we shortly 




level equilibrium unemployment rate; b) the Blanchard and 
Diamond model (1989), based on constant-level 
unemployment rate and vacancies; c) the definition of 
Beveridge Curve in rationing models, based on the idea of 
frictionless micro-markets (Lambert, 1988). 
 
1.3. The Theoretical Matching Model  
1.3.1. Deriving the Beveridge Curve 
Assume the economy produces only one good consumed by 
pairs of risk-neutral workers and employers. They decide what 
to do with full knowledge of the job-matching and job-
separation processes but do not coordinate their actions: each 
firm or worker operates as an atomistic competitor. The 
equilibrium considered is a full rational expectations 
equilibrium, where firms and workers maximize their 
respective objective functions, subject to the matching and 
separation technologies, and where the flows of workers into 
unemployment is equal to the flow of workers into 
unemployment: these assumptions warrant that there is a 
unique unemployment rate at which the two flows are equal. 
The matching process considers two different types of both 
workers and firms. Each worker who already has a job is 
defined employed, N, whereas each worker who is searching 
for a job is defined ad unemployed, U: if the total labour force, 




then U = 1-N. Firms both take part in the existing job matches 
and seek new employees as well. The firm‟s effort to find an 
employee is proxied by the number of vacancies, V. The 
number of new hires, M, is determined in each period by the 
matching function, which displays the effectiveness of the 
technology that brings workers searching for jobs together with 
employers searching for workers and depends on the search 
effort of both workers and firms. The matching function is 
increasing in both its arguments, concave and homogeneous of 
degree one (constant returns to scale):  
(1)                                         
                                                                                                          
          
where e captures the effectiveness of the search intensity of 
both firms and workers in creating new job matches and can be 
influenced by structural changes in the labour market (labour 
force reallocation). Thus, this efficiency term is considered as a 
mismatch indicator and reflects both shocks (causing 
occupational, sectoral, skill and regional mismatch between 
unemployed and vacancies) and labour market institutions. 
First-degree homogeneity is an important property and is 
empirically supported and reasonable, since in a growing 
economy constant returns ensure a constant unemployment rate 




Moreover, assume that matches between vacancies and 
unemployed occur randomly after an arbitrarily short period of 
time: hence, the process that changes the state of vacant jobs 
follows a Poisson process with rate q(θ) = M/V, that is the 
probability a vacant job is matched to an unemployed worker, 
so the mean duration of a vacant job is 1/q(θ). Unemployed 
workers move into employment according to a related Poisson 
process with rate θq(θ) = M/U, that is the probability an 
unemployed finds a job: the mean duration of unemployment is 
1/θq(θ). Therefore, unemployed workers find jobs more easily 
when there are more jobs relative to the available workers, and 
firms with vacancies find workers more easily when there are 
more workers relative to the available jobs. The process which 
defines the transition out of unemployment is related to the 
process which defines the filling of jobs by the fact that jobs 
and workers meet in pairs. Due to the homogeneity of the 
matching function, q(θ) and θq(θ) are functions of the 
vacancies-unemployment ratio θ, that is an appropriate 
measure of the tightness of the labour market. Thus, 
unemployed workers find jobs more easily when there are 
more jobs relative to the available workers, and firms with 
vacancies find workers more easily when there are more 
workers relative to the available jobs. The dependence of the 
functions q(θ) and θq(θ) on the relative number of traders is an 




as they are caused by the congestion that searching firms and 
workers cause for each other during trade. They arise because, 
during trade, price is not the only allocative mechanism. 
During a short interval of time δt, there is a positive probability 
1-q(θ)δt that a firm will not find a worker and another positive 
probability 1-θq(θ)δt that an unemployed will not find a job, 
whatever the set of prices: there is a stochastic rationing, which 
cannot be removed by price adjustments, but can be made 
better or worse for the representative trader by adjustments in 
the relative number of traders in the market. If the ratio of 
hiring firms to searching workers grows, the probability of 
rationing is higher for the average firm and lower for the 
average worker, and conversely. The existence of the 
congestion effects is important for most of the properties of 
equilibrium unemployment and its efficiency.  
We assume that the job-worker pairs that experience adverse 
shocks are randomly selected. During a small time interval δt a 
worker moves from employment to unemployment with 
exogenous probability s, and an occupied job separates with the 
same probability. Therefore, these job separations follow a 
Poisson process with rate s which is independent of the process 
that describes the filling of jobs, which is exogenous in this 
version of the model. The evolution of total employment is 





(2)                                                                                                                                               
In terms of unemployment, 
(3)                                                                                                          
where         is the flow of employees moving into 
unemployment with rate s (inflow rate), and          is the 
flow of unemployed finding new jobs with probability       . 
In a steady state, as the mean rate of unemployment is constant, 
the matching function can be restated in order to obtain the 
Beveridge Curve. Actually, if the mean rate of unemployment 
is constant, we can write: 
(4)                                                 
We can rewrite (4) as an equation determining unemployment 
in terms of both transition rates, s and      : 
(5)                                      
          
                                                                               
By the properties of the matching function, the flow 
equilibrium condition (5) can be represented in vacancy-
unemployment space by a downward-sloping and convex to the 
origin curve, the Beveridge Curve.  
 
1.3.2. Job Creation and Steady-state Equilibrium in the 
Labour Market 
In the Pissarides matching model, the key driving force is job 
creation, which takes place when a firm and a worker meet and 




the firm has to open a job vacancy and search, and unemployed 
workers have to search. The number of jobs is endogenous and 
determined by profit maximization: any firm is free to open a 
job vacancy and engage in hiring, and profit maximization 
requires the profit from one more vacancy should be zero 
(zero-profit condition from firm entry). Let J be the present-
discounted value of expected profit from an occupied job and V 
the present-discounted value of expected profit from a vacant 
job. V satisfies the Bellman equation 
(6)                          
where pc represents the vacant job costs and changes state 
according to a Poisson process with rate     . In equilibrium 
all profit opportunities from new jobs are exploited, thus the 
equilibrium condition for the supply of vacant jobs is V = 0, 
implying that 
(7)                
  
    
. 
J satisfies a value equation similar to the one for vacant jobs: 
the flow capital cost of the job is rJ, whereas the job yields net 
return p-w, where p is real output and w is the cost of labour. 
The job also runs a risk s of an adverse shock, which leads to 
the loss of J. Therefore, J satisfies  
(8)                     . 
Assuming the interest rate and product value as given and 




(9)                 
       
    
  . 
Equation (9), labelled as job creation condition, corresponds to 
a marginal condition for the demand for labour, where p is the 
marginal product of labour and 
       
    
 is the expected 
capitalized value of the firm‟s hiring cost, and can be 
represented by a downward-sloping curve in θ, w space. 
Workers normally affect the equilibrium outcome through their 
job search and their influence on wage determination. In 
equilibrium, occupied jobs yield a total return greater than the 
sum of the expected returns of a searching firm and a searching 
worker. If the firm and worker who are together separate, each 
will experience an expensive search process before meeting 
another partner. Assuming all job-worker pairs are equally 
productive, the expected joint return after firm and worker 
form new matches must be the same as the joint return from 
their current match. Hence a realized job match produces some 
pure economic rent, which is equal to the sum of the expected 
search costs of the firm and the worker: wages need to share 
this economic rent, in addition to balancing the costs from 
forming the job. The monopoly rent is assumed to be shared 
according to the Nash solution to a bargaining problem, and the 
wage derived from this solution is the wi that maximizes the 
weighted product of the worker‟s and the firm‟s net return from 




the firm give up the expected return from the search (U and V 
respectively) for the expected return from the job (Wi and Ji, 
respectively); thus, 
(10)                         
       
   , 
where β   (0,1) is a relative measure of labour‟s bargaining 
strength. The first-order maximization condition satisfies  
(11)                              
and β is labour‟s share of the total surplus that an occupied job 
creates. Since U satisfies 
(12)                         , 
where z is the real return enjoyed by the worker during search 
that is assumed constant and independent of market returns, 
and making use of (11) and (7) to substitute    out of (12), 
we obtain the wage equation  
(13)                              , 
which replaces the labour supply curve of Walrasian models 
and implies an upward-sloping relation in θ, w space. pcθ is the 
average hiring cost for each unemployed worker. Workers are 
rewarded for the saving of hiring costs that the firm enjoys 
when a job is formed. The way the labour market tightness 
enters (13) is through the bargaining power of both parts: a 
higher θ denote that jobs arrive to workers at higher rate than 
workers do to vacant jobs, relative to an equilibrium with lower 
θ. Therefore the worker‟s bargaining strength is higher and the 




Labour market equilibrium is a triple (u, θ, w) that satisfies the 
flow equilibrium condition (5), the job creation condition (9) 
and the wage equation (13). Figure 1 in the Appendix shows 
equilibrium for labour market tightness and wages. The job 
creation curve slopes down in θ, w space and replaces the 
Walrasian demand curve: higher wage rates make job creation 
less profitable and leads to a lower equilibrium ratio of jobs to 
workers. The wage curve replaces the supply curve and slopes 
up: at higher tightness, the relative bargaining strength of 
market participants shifts in favour of workers. Equilibrium (θ, 
w) is at the intersection of the two curves and is unique.  
Figure 1 shows that equilibrium θ is independent of 
unemployment. The equation for this θ can be explicitly 
derived by substituting wages from (13) into (9): 
(14)                 
          
    
     . 
In the vacancy-unemployment space of Figure 2 in the 
Appendix, this is shown as a line through the origin, with slope 
θ. The steady state condition for unemployment is the 
Beveridge Curve and is convex to the origin by the properties 
of the matching technology. Equilibrium vacancies and 
unemployment are at the unique intersection of the job creation 






1.4.  The Aggregate Beveridge Curve: Definition and Shifts. 
The Beveridge Curve can represent the relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies in any segment of the labour 
market, which is characterized by important inflows and 
outflows of workers. Each worker and each job have specific 
features in terms of skills, localization, sectors, etc. Imperfect 
information on the characteristics of job vacancies opened by 
firms and job seekers makes the match between labour demand 
and supply more difficult implying the simultaneous existence 
of frictional unemployment and unsatisfied job vacancies. The 
relationship between unemployment and vacancies is 
influenced by the economic situation: when the number of job 
vacancies is equal to the number of unemployed, U=V, the 
whole labour market is in equilibrium, although disequilibria 
can exist at disaggregated (sectoral, regional, etc.) level. A 
rightward shift of the Beveridge Curve corresponds to higher 
frictional unemployment rates, the equality between 
unemployment and vacancies (U=V) determined by the 
intersection with the job creation curve is characterized by 
higher levels of unemployment.  
The position of the aggregate Beveridge Curve depends on the 
dispersion of both the unemployment-vacancies ratio across 
labour market segments and efficiency term. Therefore, the 




long periods of time. An analytical definition of the aggregate 
Bevridge Curve is formulated by Sneessens and Shadman-
Mehta (1995), who focus on the distinction between skilled and 
unskilled labour markets. Defining the structural 
unemployment rate as the one that would prevail when the 
vacancy and the unemployment rates are equal, they obtain 






   
. 
Therefore, the position of the aggregate Beveridge Curve 
depends on both parameters ρ and μ: the inverse of ρ measures 
the importance of frictions on the skilled labor market, whereas 
the inverse of μ measures the importance of skill mismatch. 
Structural shocks determine movements along the Beveridge 
Curve (aggregate shocks, which have temporary effects) or 
shifts of the curve itself (sectoral or reallocative shocks, which 
have permanent effects). Aggregate shocks are cyclical 
variations in productivity: a negative (positive) technological 
shock reduces (increases) labour‟s marginal product and 
induces firms to open less (more) job vacancies, which ceteris 
paribus entails less (more) workers/job matches and lowers 
(increases) the inflow rate from unemployment. Aggregate 
shocks are temporary and move the economy along the 
Beveridge Curve. They correspond to rotations of the job 
creation curve: vacancy rate decreases (increases) and 




reasonable assumption that vacancies adjust to shocks more 
quickly than does unemployment, the return to an initial 
Beveridge curve equilibrium after an aggregate shock will 
follow an anticlockwise loop, with vacancies adjusting 
upwards more quickly than unemployment falls. For example, 
a rise in productivity shifts the wage curve up and the job 
creation curve to the right, causing an immediate rise in both 
labour market tightness and wages, which jump to their new 
equilibrium without adjustment dynamics. In the Beveridge 
Curve diagram (see Figure 3 in the Appendix), the impact 
effect is an anticlockwise rotation of job creation line. If the 
initial equilibrium point is A, initially equilibrium jumps to B, 
as firms open more vacancies to take advantage of the higher 
productivity. Unemployment dynamics move the economy 
down the new job creation line, toward the new steady-state 
equilibrium point C. In the case of a fall in productivity, the 
economy moves in the opposite direction, from C to D and then 
up to A. Therefore, vacancies and unemployment trace 
anticlockwise loops around the Beveridge Curve. 
On the other hand, reallocative shocks bring about a change in 
the matching technology, which shifts the Beveridge Curve. 
For example, an outward shift (see Figure 4 in the Appendix) 
of the curve can be interpreted as a reduction of matching 
efficiency, because of: a) a deterioration of human capital  




the search ability of the unemployed (Layard and Nickell, 
1987); b) a negative perception of the long-term unemployed 
on the part of potential employers (Pissarides, 1992; Blanchard 
and Diamond, 1994)
3
; c) a higher availability of unemployment 
benefits, which reduces the propensity of the unemployed to 
look for a job and their willingness to fill out the vacancies 
(Layard and Nickell, 1987).  
Furthermore, changes in the condition for special groups of the 
labour force could be relevant: for example, the employment 
and income perspectives have worsened for unskilled workers 
in the process of economic globalisation, as their jobs have 
been exported to the low-wage countries (Nickell and Bell, 
1995). If the Beveridge Curve for the low skilled has drifted 
outwards, a corresponding shift could also occur in the 
aggregate curve (Song and Webster, 2003). Changing trends in 
the demographic composition of the labour force because of an 
increase in the participation rate of women or immigration 
might also be relevant. The sectoral shift hypothesis suggested 
by Lilien (1982) can also be relevant here: in periods of crisis, 
labour and capital market imperfections may limit the 
possibility of moving resources between sectors and matching 
efficiency may worsen due to the lacking skills of displaced 
 
3 Microeconomic studies provide corroborating evidence that, when firms receive 
multiple acceptable applications, they hire the worker who has been unemployed for 
the least amount of time. An adverse effect of unemployment on workers' 
psychological health has been found by Warr (1987) and Heady and Smith (1989), 





workers who have to fill positions in the newly expanding 
sectors. Finally, hysteresis in the course of unemployment 
could affect the position of the curve. Indeed, a movement 
along the curve would imply an outward shift in the next 
period. Hysteresis might be traced to human capital 
deterioration of the long term unemployed or a negative 
perception of long unemployment spells on employers.  
Provided that shifts can be precisely attributed to structural 
factors, the above framework can provide important insights to 
policymakers. For instance, if reforms try to improve the 
efficiency of the search process on the labour market, their 
success could be measured by a marked inward shift of the 
Beveridge Curve. If, however, other factors different from 
those usually singled out were also relevant in explaining the 
shifts, this evidence would be seriously biased. 
There is no consensus in literature about the role played by the 
above-mentioned factors in determining the behaviour of the 
Beveridge Curve. Börsch-Supan (1991) and Wall and Zoega 
(2002) estimate Beveridge Curves and analyze their shifts for 
United Kingdom and Spain respectively, finding that the 
behaviour of the Beveridge Curve is explained better by 
business cycle than by structural imbalances. Different results 
are achieved by Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Layard et al. 
(1991) and Padoa-Schioppa (1991), who actually verify the 




increasing at the same time the number of firms looking for 
workers and the number of workers looking for jobs. Other 
studies (Jackman et al., 1991; Lescure and L‟Horty, 1994; 
Sneessens et al., 1998; Dolado and Gomez, 1997; Fonseca e 
Munoz, 2003) confirm the crucial role of the reallocative 
shocks in explaining the performance of the Beveridge Curve. 
 
1.5. The production Frontier Approach 
Recently, some interesting empirical analyses concerning the 
empirical analysis of the matching function (Warren, 1991; 
Gorter and van Ours, 1994, for Netherlands; Fahr and Sunde, 
2002, 2006, for Germany; Ilmakunnas and Pesola, 2003, for 
Finland; Ibourk et al., 2004, for France; Destefanis and 
Fonseca, 2007, for Italy) have exploited the deep conceptual 
and analytical resemblance between this function and the 
production function. This has implied a use of the 
methodologies developed in the field of stochastic production 
frontiers (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) in the empirical 
analysis of the matching function and the Beveridge Curve. 
Stochastic production frontiers rely on the assumption that the 
technical efficiency of a productive unit is measured by the 
distance between the input and output mixes observed for the 




production frontier relevant for the observed unit. In the case of 
the matching function                          
(16)                          , 
where e is the efficiency parameter, examine Figure 5 in the 
Appendix, where various mixes of Ut-1 and Vt-1, all of them 
capable of producing the output Ht (H0t), are considered along 
an isoquant. The Ut-1 and Vt-1 combinations on the isoquant are 
efficient points. For each value of Ut-1 on the isoquant they 
mark out the minimum Vt-1 value consistent with obtaining H0t, 
and conversely for each Ut-1 value. It will always be possible to 
achieve H0t for Ut-1 and Vt-1 values higher than those on the 
isoquant, but this will not be technically efficient. Thus, both 
points B and C are inefficient, whereas A is technically 
efficient. Adopting the measure of technical efficiency 
suggested in Farrell (1957), that is the largest radial input 
contraction consistent with obtaining a given output (in this 
case H0t), the technical efficiency of C is OC‟/OC, that of B is 
OB‟/OB and that of A is OA/OA. The latter, being fully 
efficient, has an efficiency score equal to one, while the 
technical efficiency of C is higher than that of B, which is 
situated further away from the isoquant.  
Let us now consider more closely the most recent among the 
above-mentioned empirical contributions. 
Gorter and van Ours (1994) use annual data for 11 Dutch 




matching function with regional dummies, allowing to the 
efficiency parameter to vary over time and across regions; then, 
they compute regional efficiency scores from the coefficients 
of the dummy variables. The estimation results show that the 
matching process can be described by a “search production” 
function with constant returns to scale and the efficiency 
increased substantially during the economic recession that took 
place in the beginning of the 1980s. Furthermore, the labour 
markets in the peripheral regions perform somewhat better than 
the core regions, but efficiency differences appear to be modest 
for most regions, suggesting that unfavourable regional labour 
market conditions are caused by a lack of regional demand. 
Ibourk et al. (2004) consider monthly data for the 22 French 
regions from March 1990 to February 1995, including in the 
estimates (beside a linear trend) a considerable number of 
explanatory variables meant to capture workers and firm 
characteristics as potential determinants for inefficiency. After 
obtaining regional efficiency scores for each year using 
maximum likelihood according to Battese and Coelli (1995) 
approach, they verify how much efficiency is explained by the 
potential efficiency determinants through the difference 
between average gross efficiency (the average efficiency score 
obtained when the explanatory variables take their actual 
values) and average net efficiency (the average efficiency score 




value, equal to their sample average). They find that: a) 
average matching efficiency declines over the time period 
considered, and about 30% of this decrease can be traced back 
to changes in the explanatory variables considered; b) there are 
also wide - and quite stable over time – regional differences, 
reflecting in part (for about 25%) differences in the 
characteristics of firms and workers. The hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale for the matching function is not 
rejected. 
Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003) consider annual data for the 14 
Finnish regions from 1988 to 1997 and include among the 
potential determinants of inefficiency the average 
unemployment and vacancy rates of the neighbouring regions, 
which in authors‟ opinion allow for the spillover effects 
highlighted by Burda and Profit (1996) and Burgess and Profit 
(2001). Both variables enter significantly and with the expected 
signs in the estimates. 
Fahr and Sunde (2006) analyze the efficiency of the matching 
process in West-Germany using annual data for a panel of 117 
labour market regions over the period 1980-1997. After 
achieving regional efficiency scores and showing that regions 
vary substantially with respect to the matching efficiency of 
their labour markets and the efficiency pattern and the implied 
ranking of regions is stable over the observation period, they 




regions and regress the estimated efficiency of the matching 
process in a given region in a given year on the spatial 
autocorrelation pattern in form of the value of the Local 
Moran‟s I Statistic for the respective period in the respective 
region. They find that high spatial autocorrelation (high job 
creation activity in a certain region is associated with high job 
creation in nearby regions) is associated with a relatively low 
matching efficiency, which implies indirect evidence for 
crowding externalities. 
Focusing on the Italian labour market, Destefanis and Fonseca 
(2007) use a matching theory approach to assess the impact on 
this market of the so-called 1997 Treu Act (Legge Treu), which 
considerably eased the regulation of temporary work and 
favoured its growth in Italy. They re-parameterize the matching 
function as a Beveridge Curve and estimate it as a production 
frontier, finding huge differences in matching efficiency 
between the South and the rest of the country. The Treu Act 
appears to have improved matching efficiency in the North of 
the country, particularly for skilled workers, but also to have 
strengthened competition among skilled and unskilled workers, 







1.6. The Matching Process and the Great Recession 
The severity of the current recession, labelled as the Great 
Recession because of its fall in world trade and the stock 
markets worst than in the first years subsequent to the 1929 US 
Stock market crash, raises obvious concerns about the labour 
market adjustment and its persistency. Job losses may translate 
in longer spells of unemployment (the hysteresis phenomenon), 
through the deterioration of skills and the negative perception 
of the long-term unemployed on the part of potential 
employers, and a falling labour supply, ultimately translating in 
higher natural rate of unemployment. Thus, as we have seen in 
Section 4, longer spells of unemployment may increase the 
labour market mismatch and bring about an outward shift of 
the Beveridge Curve. 
Indeed, the extensive unemployment inflows, which a 
recession usually generates, can be detrimental for the strength 
of the following recovery. If the large stock of the newly 
unemployed workers is not absorbed very quickly when the 
recovery sets in, labour supply may be negatively affected, 
which may result in an obstacle to future growth. Unemployed 
workers may become less effective in their job-search, because 
the recession may affect either the efficiency with which 
information about vacancies is transferred or the time and 




a lengthy period of weak labour demand may reduce the search 
effort of unemployed as despondency originates after many not 
successful attempts of finding a job (the so-called 
"discouraged" worker effect). 
Unconditional and extremely generous unemployment benefits 
(increased to soften the social consequences of the crisis) may 
bring about a moral hazard problem which hardens the 
propensity of job-searcher to be highly selective with regard to 
a job offer and increase their reservation wage, that is the wage 
level at which they are willing to accept job offers. At the same 
time, however, during recessions households' income can be 
heavily weakened by the risks of unemployment of the bread-
winner (typically the male components of the household). This 
creates a negative wealth effect that drives other components of 
the household to put more effort in the job search to 
compensate for the expected loss in household income and 
smooth consumption. This 'added' worker effect implies that in 
periods of high unemployment the labour supply of women 
increases, as the consumption smoothing motive prevails on 
factors, such as the low substitution of leisure between the 
husband and the wife (for cultural reasons or lack of childcare 
services), that keeps women out of the labour market. Whether 
the 'discouraged worker' or the 'added worker' effect prevails in 




Another potential reason for a persistent reduction in match 
efficiency is the likelihood of a mismatch between the skills of 
the unemployed and the skill requirements of job openings. 
Groshen and Potter (2003) have claimed that the jobless 
recoveries after the 1990 and 2001 recessions were in large part 
due to structural reallocation of workers across sectors in the 
economy. They assert that this reallocation led to a mismatch 
in skill-mix resulting in a slower adjustment of the labor 
market than in previous recessions.  
More recently, Phelps (2008) has reiterated this concern in 
relation to construction and finance workers in the 2007 
recession. Hence, structural imbalances, concerning mainly 
construction and finance, should be countered favouring the 
mobility of workers across different industries. Protracted 
sectoral shifts (recall Lilien‟s (1982) sectoral shift hypothesis) 
may make the skills of some workers – particularly those 
formerly employed in industries with non-transferable skills – 
obsolete, leading to very serious skill mismatches. When, due 
to the process of sectoral reallocation, job destruction is high 
and unemployment remains high, the human capital of the 
labour force deteriorates, strengthening the skill mismatch 
through hysteresis and leading to an outward shift of the 
Beveridge Curve and to the risk of unemployment hysteresis. 
The first analyses of the response of the labour market to the 




(2010), with regard to the European economies, and Elsby et 
al. (2010), as regards the USA.  
Arpaia and Curci assess the labour market adjustment in the 
EU member countries, highlighting that the size of the labour 
market adjustment and its composition have been significantly 
different across countries, because of the size of domestic and 
external imbalances, and of the particular characteristics of the 
workforce in those industries mostly affected by the crisis. 
Workers with weaker employment contracts, the less qualified 
and less experienced workers are the socio-economic groups 
hit harder by the current recession. In many countries job 
destruction has been more intense in male dominated sectors, 
but the relative effects of the current recession on men and 
women are not particularly unusual if compared with previous 
recessions, whereas the increase in the young unemployment 
rates is a distinctive element of the latest recession. Moreover, 
European countries show very heterogeneous patterns in 
inflows into and outflows from unemployment: for example, 
both flows increase in the Nordic countries, whereas some 
countries like Spain and Ireland are experiencing an impressive 
surge in the inflow rate; inflows and outflows do not change 
much for countries such as Germany and Italy. Finally, Arpaia 
and Curci suggest that the expected increase in unemployment 
is similar to that estimated for the recession of the early 1990s 




can be influenced by a deterioration of the matching between 
vacancies and unemployed as the average unemployment rate 
increases. Evidence based on survey data suggests that, so far, 
in this recession the increase in unemployment rates linked to 
mismatching is due to a lack of demand for labour rather than 
an increase in the mismatch between vacancies and skills. 
Thus, there have been moves along rather than shifts of the 
Beveridge curve. It is true that the size of adjustment required 
in certain sectors may imply that sectoral shifts may take time 
to occur, making the skills of workers, particularly those 
formerly employed in industries with non-transferable skills, 
obsolete. Nevertheless, according to Arpaia and Curci, past 
evidence suggests that the impact of Lilen-type effects on 
structural unemployment has been, on average, small. 
As regards the US labour market, Elsby et al. suggest that, 
even though the current downturn is definitely the deepest 
deterioration in labor market outcomes on record in the 
postwar era, many of the features of labor market dynamics in 
the Great Recession until the latter half of 2009 are similar to 
those seen in earlier recessions, both in terms of the behaviour 
of employment and labour force participation rate and in terms 
of the demographic groups most affected, with young, male, 
less-educated, workers from ethnic minorities being more 
damaged. Moreover, in terms of flows, just as in previous deep 




determined by both increased rates of inflow, as well as 
increased duration, with inflows being relatively more 
important early on in the downturn. Increased inflows into 
unemployment have been driven predominantly by a change in 
the composition of separations toward layoffs, who are very 
likely to become unemployed, and away from quits, who are 
very likely to flow to a new job upon separation. Thus, 
contrary to claims of recent literature that has emphasized the 
relatively acyclical behaviour of the rate at which workers 
separate from employers, increases in layoffs have played a 
key role in driving increased unemployment in the recession.  
Despite the above-mentioned similarities, some of recent 
evidence suggests an important difference with respect to past 
phenomena: rates of exit of unemployed workers from 
joblessness have slowed to record levels, drawing into focus 
the importance of a rebound in outflow rates for the recovery. 
However, this is unlikely to create for the US labour market an 
hysteresis problem as severe as the European one of the 1980's: 
the US unemployed still leave unemployment as much as four 
times faster than those in continental Europe. 
 
1.7. Concluding Remarks. 
This chapter has provided a conceptual introduction to the 




First, we focused on the matching approach founding the 
studies on the Curve since the late 1970‟s.  
Then, we relied on Pissarides (2000) in order to derive 
analytically the Curve and to consider some potential 
determinants of matching efficiency which determine its shifts, 
and introduced the more recent production frontier approach. 
Among the potential determinants of matching efficiency, we 
have just mentioned some significant shift factors that literature 
on Beveridge Curve did not take into account exhaustively. 
More specifically, we refer to the role of globalisation and 
technological progress and the potential existence of spillover 
effects in the matching process. In the next chapters we will 
focus just on the impact of these variables on the Beveridge 
Curve, and will take again into consideration the shifting role 
of mismatch indicators (it is not clear why they did disappear 
from the most recent empirical literature). 
Finally, we presented some explanatory analyses about the 
impact of the Great Recession on the matching process: 
according to them the current recession is unlikely to create an 
hysteresis problem such as to determine shifts of the Beveridge 
Curve in the European and US labour markets.  
In conclusion, we point out some considerations for future 
reference: a) the matching process has often been specified in 
terms of a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant 




be tricky, but there seems to be no great analytical price to pay 
(and eventually some empirical gain to obtain) from using 
more flexible functional forms. This is however a consideration 
which is likely to have more importance for studies based on 
micro-data rather than for the usual macroeconometric set-up 
of the Beveridge Curve; b) most empirical analyses rely on a 
single-equation approach to the matching function (or the 
Beveridge Curve). It would be interesting to see more estimates 
based on a multi-equation approach considering matching 
jointly with job creation and wage formation (an early but 
isolated example of this approach is given by Dolado and 
Gomez, 1997). Obviously, such an approach would gain 
greatly from the adoption of cointegration-based techniques, 
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Figure 3. The Beveridge Curve: a counter-clockwise loop 
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Figure 5. The matching function as an isoquant 
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Chapter II. Beveridge Curve, Technological 
Progress and Globalisation 
2.1. Introduction 
In the literature concerning the Beveridge Curve, only a few 
contributions (Pissarides, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1994) 
have examined the role of technological progress as a 
significant shift factor for labour market performance. 
However, there is no unanimity about the sign of its impact. In 
the conventional matching model with technological change 
(Pissarides, 1990; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998), a higher 
rate of growth implies a higher present value of jobs, which 
spurs the recruiting activity and raises the job finding rate of 
unemployed workers: thus, in terms of Beveridge Curve, the 
so-called capitalization effect should increase the willingness 
of employers to open new positions and the matching 
efficiency, which shifts the curve inwards. On the contrary, 
Aghion and Howitt (1994) propose the creative-destruction 
effect (Schumpeterian models), whose underlying intuition is 
that growth has a reallocative aspect that the previous 
conventional model ignores: faster technological change is 
accompanied by faster obsolescence of skills and technologies, 
hence, more intense labour turnover and higher frictional 




obsolescence should worsen matching efficiency, regardless of 
search intensity, which shifts the curve outwards.  
Few economists would deny that globalisation, that is the 
growing international interdependence in communications, 
trade, finance, labour markets (migration), social systems, is 
one of fundamental socio-economic phenomena of this turn of 
century. Consequently, globalisation is another factor which is 
expected to impact on the Beveridge Curve. Indeed, as we have 
seen in Chapter I, according to Nickell and Bell (1995) and 
Song and Webster (2003), the Beveridge Curve for unskilled 
workers should have shifted outwards in recent years, due to 
exportation of their jobs to the low-wage countries entailed by 
the process of globalisation. A corresponding outward shift in 
the aggregate Beveridge Curve should also follow. 
The aim of this chapter is to test the existence of a Beveridge 
Curve analysing the economies of nineteen OECD countries 
from 1980 to 2004, and to investigate whether and how 
technological progress and globalisation affect the 
unemployment-vacancies trade-off. The empirical set-up draws 
inspiration from Nickell et al. (2003), that analysed the Curve 
for a similar OECD sample, but did not allow for technological 
progress and globalisation.   
The paper has the following structure. In Sections 2 and 3, we 
present in detail some recent contributions focusing on the 




unemployment; in Section 4 we examine some empirical 
literature on OECD countries (chiefly Nickell et al., 2003, as 
well as Koeniger et al., 2007) providing further motivation to 
our study; in Section 5 we present the empirical specification 
and the data; the results are commented in Section 6, whereas 
Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2.2. The Impact of Technological Progress and Labour 
Market Matching 
In the most recent literature concerning labour market 
performance and the Beveridge Curve, some contributions 
have stood out focusing on technological progress as one of the 
key variability factors in the labour market. On the one hand, 
technological developments change the structure of the labour 
demand, which tends to be biased in favour of higher 
professional competences, especially if orientated towards 
growing sectors. On the other hand, more powerful means of 
communication make the flow of information faster and 
cheaper and, consequently, labour market, as well as other 
kinds of market, more efficient.  
Postel-Vinay (2002) aims at analysing the influence of the rate 
of technological change on the level of unemployment and, in 
particular, comparing the short- and long-run effects of 




statement (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998) that faster growth 
reduces the long-run unemployment rate through capitalization 
effect, or leads to a rise in long-run unemployment through a 
creative destruction effect (the so-called Schumpeterian models 
developed in Aghion and Howitt, 1994), depending on the 
particular technological assumptions adopted: the capitalization 
effect rests on the assumption that firms are able to update their 
technology continuously and at no expense, which precludes 
technological obsolescence, whereas creative destruction arises 
from the extreme opposite assumption of total irreversibility in 
the firms‟ technological choices.  
The above results are grounded on the long-run analysis of the 
relationships between unemployment and economic growth. 
Aside from that, the short-run behaviour of the conventional 
matching model is quite well known, but, importantly, not 
much has been said so far about the short-run behaviour of 
unemployment in a creative destruction context.  
Then, let us suppose that the correct model is of Schumpeterian 
inspiration, that is there is total irreversibility and the economy 
leaves no space for any form of capitalization effect. A 
speedup in growth eventually leads to a fall in long-run 
employment. Postel-Vinay‟s purpose is to find out whether, in 
that case, sustained technological change is detrimental to 
employment even in the short-run. Critics of the 




there is very convincing evidence according to which 
unemployment rates respond negatively to changes in the 
productivity growth rates. For instance, the productivity 
slowdown of the mid-1970‟s was accompanied by a rise in 
unemployment in most OECD countries. However, this 
argument implicitly ignores the possible differences among 
short-run and long-run predictions of the model. Short-run 
predictions may go in the opposite direction of long-run ones, 
and be closer to the usually quoted evidence. Postel-Vinay adds 
that there is no a priori reason to think that the long-run effects 
should be the only ones to consider, or even that they should be 
in some sense more important than short-run effects. 
Then, Postel-Vinay shows a simple model of job destruction, 
studies its steady-state and comparative static properties, 
proceeds to a theoretical study of its dynamics, finally presents 
some numerical simulations of the model. Simulations confirm 
that the short-run adjustment of unemployment goes the 
„„wrong way‟‟ with respect to long-run outcomes and point out 
that impact effects are of potentially great magnitude. How 
much more empirical support do the short-run predictions of 
the model get? Unfortunately, the answer to that question 
appears to be: not so much. In particular, the model fails to 
explain unemployment persistence. According to the model, 
the time it takes the unemployment rate to be back at its 




well under the duration of a business cycle. Even though the 
1970‟s slowdown was typically deeper in Europe than in the 
United States, which, as the model would have predicted, led to 
higher peaks in unemployment, the U.S. unemployment rate 
went back down since then, whereas the European 
unemployment rates remained at very high levels, and even 
kept on increasing in the early 1980‟s, in spite of the partial 
recovery of productivity growth. 
Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) aim at investigating the impact 
of total factor productivity (TFP) growth on unemployment, 
considering that theoretical predictions are ambiguous and 
depend on the extent to which new technologies is embodied in 
new jobs: therefore, they evaluate a model with embodied and 
disembodied technology and capitalization and creative 
destruction effects, including some measures of capital per 
worker and TFP in the model, which are expected to have 
different effects on unemployment, because the costs of 
adjustment in capital are different from the technology 
implementation lags. As job destruction reacts faster than job 
creation to shocks, the impact effect of productivity growth 
(capital stock) on unemployment should be positive (negative) 
in the short-run and turn negative (positive) in the medium- to 
long-run. 
They start from the econometric estimates of the impact of TFP 




1995 for the countries of the European Union (except for Spain 
and Greece), the USA and Japan. The conclusion is that the 
negative impact of TFP growth on unemployment is 
substantial, both in terms of the estimated elasticities and in 
terms of the contribution of TFP growth to the explanation of 
the evolution of the unemployment rate in the last thirty years. 
Moreover, both productivity growth and capital stock have the 
expected short- and long-run effects on unemployment. 
Then, “creative destruction” appears to play no part in the 
steady-state unemployment dynamics of the countries in the 
sample and the Solow growth model augmented by an 
unemployment equation is an appropriate framework for the 
study of unemployment dynamics. 
Consequently, Pissarides and Vallanti evaluate a matching 
model with embodied and disembodied technology, 
capitalization and creative destruction effects and verify 
whether this model matches the estimated impacts. They find 
that: a) consistency between the empirical evidence and the 
model requires totally disembodied technology, because when 
technology is embodied creative destruction effects have a 
much bigger quantitative impact on unemployment than 
capitalization effects; b) with entirely disembodied technology, 
the capitalization effect of faster growth is quantitatively 
sufficiently strong to explain alone the full impact of TFP 




satisfied: 1) wages need to be insulated from labour market 
conditions, in particular the vacancy-unemployment ratio, and 
2) the firms need to discount the revenues from new jobs over 
an infinite horizon.  
 
2.3. Globalisation and Labour Market Matching 
As international interdependence and integration grew 
significantly and more and at a furious pace in the last decades, 
the impact of globalisation on labour market matching and 
performance looks like another issue highly worthy of 
discussion. As shall be clear from the following discussion, 
however, this discussion has never been embodied in economic 
models similar to those examined in the previous section. 
Higher unemployment and loss of jobs are quite commonly 
associated with globalisation, mainly due to the following 
arguments: a) multinationals have exported jobs from 
developed countries to developing countries through foreign 
investments and outward production in special economic 
zones; b) through trade liberalization, governments have 
encouraged the replacement of domestically produced goods 
with goods produced abroad; c) the increased application of 
technology, especially in globally operating companies, can 




overlaps with the role of technological progress highlighted in 
the previous section).  
With regard to that, an interesting analysis is represented by the 
report produced by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU) at its 16
th
 World Congress (1996). It 
claims that our societies are more and more polarized between 
those who have the wealth or skill to gain from global 
integration and those who remain trapped in poverty without 
productive employment. Unlike free-market ideologists‟ 
beliefs, who argue the vast numbers of low-paid jobs will 
gradually become better-paid through investment and 
productivity, rationalization and restructuring are causing the 
disappearance of secure decently paid jobs and world 
unemployment is rising. World growth rates are stuck at levels 
which allow little or no scope for the poorest countries to 
expand their way out of poverty, neither is growth in 
industrialized and transition countries being translated into 
more employment. The fundamental problem is that the 
overriding objective of organizing production to meet basic 
human needs is not being achieved as a result of governments' 
infatuation with market-oriented policies. African urban 
unemployment had doubled since the 1970's to reach between 
15 and 20% ; unemployment had risen to 10% and more in 
several countries of Latin America, and in most countries of 




has reached into the world's most advanced economies. The 
high levels of unemployment of the early 1980's recession have 
fallen at an agonizingly slow pace. In industrial countries, 
unemployment is rising amongst low-skilled and relatively 
low-paid male workers, who have traditionally found work in 
the manufacturing sectors that are most exposed to increased 
competition. 
Another relevant contribution is provided by Thorpe (1997). 
Corporations have used their international power to increase 
their power also within countries. Through this power they 
have been able to secure government compliance with social 
and economic policies which suit their global objectives - 
especially deflationary policies, abandonment of full-
employment policies, labour market flexibilisation, lower 
taxation of executive salaries, higher interest rates, 
restructuring of the welfare state and privatisation. The same 
strategies have been deployed within the intergovernmental 
structures (World Bank, International Monetary Fund and 
OECD, for example) by ideologically captive governments. 
These global and national policies resulted in a marked 
deterioration of effectiveness in social policy and have 
undermined previously accepted roles for governments and 
norms in relation to social justice and the public good. Through 
their power the corporations have been able to externalise 




shedding labour and employing higher-yielding capital. Their 
control over international trade and investment has enabled 
them to use threats to intensify inter-government and inter-
worker competition and to weaken attempts at improving 
working conditions and benefits. The result has been to reduce 
social equity, to increase unemployment and unstable 
employment and to achieve high rates of income growth for the 
higher income groups. 
The opposite view is that globalisation (e.g. through foreign 
investment, trade, new technology and liberalization) 
contributes to growth, which is the key to employment. 
Unemployment, on the other hand, is mainly due to 
governments' failure to adopt sound macroeconomic and labour 
market policies. In particular, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and OECD
4
 share the opinion that structural adjustment 
policies and globalisation, far from being the main sources of 
unemployment, can be taken advantage of in a strategy for 
better growth and employment. The example of the countries 
which represent the world growth locomotives would 
demonstrate how such programs, applied with perseverance, 
can contribute to improving human living standards, but such 
improvement will never be an automatic result of a miraculous 
economic model able to prevent the major plagues of our 
societies as well. Thus, it is required that governments have 
 




their priorities right, and accept to complement the structural 
adjustment program by a major effort at reforming the state, 
including, in particular, reducing unproductive spending, 
collecting properly the taxes from those who can pay, and 
allocating them more efficiently to key social priorities. 
Below we do not provide a discussion of the relationships 
between globalisation and labour market matching within a 
model similar to those examined in the previous section. We 
proceed however to set up a framework for empirical analysis 
where the effects of globalisation and technological progress 
are jointly measured and appraised. 
 
2.4. The Empirical Literature on OECD Countries 
Our framework for empirical analysis draws inspiration chiefly 
from a paper by Nickell et al. (2003), which analyzes 
empirically the unemployment patterns in the OECD countries 
from the 1960s to the 1990s, through a detailed study of 
changes in real wages and unemployment, as well as shifts in 
the Beveridge Curves in twenty countries (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,  
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States). Their basic aim was to ascertain, using a very 




changes in those labour market institutions which might be 
expected to impact on equilibrium unemployment. Actually, 
Nickell et al. include in their regression analysis both a set of 
institutional variables expected to influence equilibrium 
unemployment in the long-run, and a set of other structural 
factors (changes in the rate of growth of the nominal money 
stock, changes in TFP growth or deviations of TFP growth 
from trend, labour demand shocks measured by the residual 
from a simple labour demand model, proportional changes in 
real import prices weighted by the trade share, the ex-post real 
interest rate) which might explain the short-run deviations of 
unemployment from its equilibrium level.  
 
Table 1. Factors affecting equilibrium unemployment, Nickell et al. (2003) 
Institutional variables Unemployment benefit replacement ratio 
Benefit duration index 
Bargaining coordination index 
Collective bargaining coverage 
Union density 
Employment protection legislation 
Labour taxes 
Owner occupation rate 
Structural variables Rate of growth of nominal money stock 
TFP growth 
Labour demand shocks 
Real import prices weighted by trade share 
Ex-post interest rate 
 
What is however remarkable from our point of view is that, 
without any theoretical or empirical justification, no structural 




obviously also includes variables which may be linked to the 
role of technological progress or globalisation. On the other 
hand, an important role is played in the estimates by the inflow 
rate, defined as the monthly inflow into unemployment divided 
by employment. Given that the Beveridge Curve equation is 
estimated through LSDV, and that the inflow rate is likely to be  
determined jointly with unemployment, there is some concern 




In any case, the Nickell et al. results indicate the Beveridge 
Curves of all the countries except Norway and Sweden shifted 
to the right from the 1960s to the early/mid 1980s. At this 
point, the countries divide into two distinct groups, those 
whose Beveridge Curves continued to shift out and those 
where they started to shift back. Second, these movements in 
the Beveridge Curves are partly explained by changes in labour 
market institutions. In particular, union density, unemployment 
benefit duration and owner occupation shift the Curves to the 
right whereas stricter employment protection shift them to the 
left. Indeed, stricter employment laws may lead to an increased 
professionalisation of the personnel function within firms, as 
was the case in Britain in the 1970's (see Daniel and Stilgoe, 
1978), which can increase matching efficiency. The possibility 
 
5 In our opinion, endogeneity issues are also likely to concern the vacancy rate, as 
well as the institutional variables. It is anyway true that neglect of the issues is quite 




that the estimates are affected by endogeneity and omitted 
variable bias raises however some doubt about the soundness 
of these results. Further inspiration for our empirical 
framework was also drawn from a paper by Koeniger et al. 
(2007). This paper first shows in a simple model of bilateral 
monopoly how labour market institutions affect labour 
demand, the surplus of the firms and workers and thus the 
wage differential, then uses panel data from 11 OECD 
countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and USA) to determine how 
much of the increase in wage inequality across countries can be 
attributed to changes in institutions within countries, 
employing an empirical set-up similar to Nickell et al. (2003). 
Crucially, from our point of view, this paper also directly 
relates wage inequality to a set of variables related to 
technological progress and globalisation: R&D intensity and 
import (from non-OECD countries) intensity as well. 
 
Table 2. Factors affecting wage inequality, Koeniger et al. (2007) 
 Koeniger et al. (2007) 
Institutional 
variables 
Unemployment benefit replacement ratio 
Benefit duration index 
Bargaining coordination index 
Union density 
Employment protection legislation 
Tax wedge 
Minimum wage 
Other variables R&D intensity 





From the joint analysis of these two papers, we have then 
drawn the idea of assessing the impact of institutional variables 
on the Beveridge Curves of various OECD countries, also 
allowing for the impact of globalisation and technological 
progress. 
 
2.5. The Econometric Analysis: Empirical Specification and 
Data 
2.5.1. The Model  
The basic model is a proper Cobb-Douglas dynamic 
specification of the Beveridge Curve given the inflow rate, 
(1)                                                 
                                                   
                                                 
                                                  
                
     , 
 
where i = 1, …, N stands for the country, and t = 1, …, T 
stands for the time period (year). We posit a simple fixed-
effects AutoRegressive-Distributed Lags (1,1) specification. uit 
is the natural log of the unemployment rate, vit the natural log 
of the vacancy rate, infit the natural log of the inflow rate, globit 
the natural log of the globalisation index, tpit the technological 




total factor productivity, zit a vector of institutional variables 
which are expected to influence unemployment either because 
of their impact on the effectiveness with which the unemployed 
are matched to available jobs or because of their direct effect 
on wages, D and E are vectors of yearly and country dummies 
respectively, t a time trend, εit a stochastic variable assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed and β, γ, δ,  θ, and 
τ are the parameters of the model. We follow Pissarides and 
Vallanti (2007) in introducing two lags for unemployment and 
in including capital per worker and TFP in the model. As 
suggested by the authors, we expect the capital stock and TFP 
have different effects on unemployment, because the costs of 
adjustment in capital are different from the technology 
implementation lags: as job destruction reacts faster than job 
creation to shocks, the impact effect of productivity growth 
(capital stock) on unemployment should be positive (negative) 
in the short-run and turn negative (positive) in the medium- to 
long-run. 
The TFP is computed using the formula from Pissarides and 
Vallanti (2007):  
(2)             
 
   
                         ,  
where Y is gross domestic output at constant price and national 
currencies, K is capital stock as defined above, L is total 
employment, (1-ā) is a smoothed share of labour following the 




The measure of capital we use is the ratio of the private non-
residential net capital stock (i.e. the capital stock of the 
business sector) to the total employment.  
Notice at any rate that TFP, a variable whose measurement 
notoriously gathers many different influences, is not our 
preferred measure of technological progress. We rather include 
it in the estimates as a control variable for macroeconomic 
shocks. Our preferred measure of technological progress, like 
in Koeniger et al. (2007), is the ratio of R&D expenditure over 
value added in the manufacturing sector (both variables at 
current prices). 
The globalisation index, also like in Koeniger et al. (2007), is 
given by the ratio of total manufacturing imports from no-
OECD countries to manufacturing value added (both variables 
at current prices)
6
. We would like to rely on at least another 
globalisation index, allowing for capital flows and outsourcing, 
but problems of data availability prevent us from doing so. 
The inflow rate is measured by the ratio of inflow into 
unemployment to total employment. 
In selecting our institutional variables, we relied on those 
considered in Nickell et al. (2003). In particular, we introduce: 
a) union density and bargaining coordination, as trade union 
power in wage setting has a significant positive impact on 
unemployment, but highly coordinated bargaining may 
 
6 We are very grateful to Marco Leonardi (University of Milan, Italy) for making 




completely offset the negative impact of unionism on 
employment
7
; b) employment protection legislation, whose 
overall impact is an empirical issue: actually, on the one hand it 
tends to make firms more prudent about filling vacancies, 
which slows the speed at which the unemployed move into 
work, reducing the efficiency of job matching; on the other 
hand, however, employment protection laws often lead to an 
increased professionalization of the personnel function within 
firms and lean to reduce involuntary separations and 
consequently reduce inflows into unemployment; c) 
unemployment benefits, which negatively affect the 
willingness of unemployed to fill vacancies; d) the total tax 
wedge including employer payroll taxes. 
Finally, we would like to stress that, unlike in many 
macroeconometric studies (including Nickell et al., 2003, and 
Koeniger et al., 2007), we do not restrict a priori the dynamic 
specification of our structural and institutional variables. All of 
them enter (1) with a current and a lagged value. 
 
2.5.2. The Data 
The sample is formed by nineteen OECD countries: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
 




United States. We consider a 25-year period, from 1980 to 
2004. 
The main data source is the CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set 
by William Nickell, updated by OECD datasets or integrated 
by other sources where gaps come out, especially for the latest 
years or for single variables in given countries. 
The unemployment rates are derived from Nickell and 
Nunziata (2001): they are based on OECD standardized rates 
and are an extension of those used in Layard et al. (1991).  
The vacancy rates are taken from Nickell and Nunziata (2001) 
and extended with data from OECD Main Economic Indicators 
(2006). For Italy, vacancies data derive from the survey on the 
help-wanted advertisements published in some important daily 
newspapers, carried out by CSA (Centro di Studi Aziendali, 
Florence) and ISFOL (Istituto per lo Sviluppo della 
Formazione Professionale dei Lavoratori, Rome). 
With regard to the globalisation index, total manufacturing 
imports from non-OECD countries are drawn by the OECD 
STAN Bilateral Trade Database and International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics (2004), and value added by the OECD 
STAN Database for Industrial Analysis (2005). With regard to 
technological progress, instead, the data for R&D expenditure 
are taken from the OECD Research and Development 




The source of the private non-residential net capital stock is the 
OECD Analytical Database (2002), whereas gross domestic 
output is drawn from OECD.Stat Extracts and the smoothed 
share of labour from the OECD Unit Labour Costs Dataset 
(2009).  
The inflow rate series is mainly taken from Nickell and 
Nunziata (2001). However, the data for Italy are derived from 
the ISTAT MARSS Database, and those for Switzerland from 
the OECD Database on Unemployment by Duration. 
Employment protection legislation series are obtained from 
Allard (2005a): they use the OECD methodology generating an 
index increasing on the range {0,5}. 
Union density is calculated using administrative and survey 
data from the OECD Labour Market Statistics Database and 
extending them by splicing in data from Visser (2006).  
The index of bargaining coordination is taken from OECD 
(2004), has range {1,5} and is increasing in the degree of 
coordination in the bargaining process on the employers‟ as 
well as the unions‟ side. 
Unemployment benefits series are obtained from Allard 
(2005b), who develops an indicator which combines the 
amount of the subsidy with their tax treatment, their duration 
and the conditions that must be met in order to collect them. 





2.6. The Estimates 
2.6.1. The Econometric Set-up 
Before presenting our results, we focus on the econometric 
approach we used and the reasons which guided our choices.  
A basic influence was the paper by Judson and Owen (1999), 
that aims at providing a guide to choosing appropriate 
techniques for panels of various dimensions. Their results, 
based on a Monte Carlo analysis, show that Kiviet‟s corrected 
Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator (LSDVC) is the best 
choice for any balanced panel, whereas for unbalanced panels: 
a) if T = 30, where T is the time dimension of the panel, LSDV 
performs just as well or better than the viable alternatives; b) 
when T ≤ 10, Arellano and Bond‟s one-step Generalized 
Method of Moments estimator (AB GMM) is the best choice; 
c) when T = 20, AB GMM or Anderson and Hsiao estimator 
(AH) may be chosen. These results are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 3. Judson and Owen’s recommendations on dynamic 
panel     data estimations. 
 T≤10  T=20  T=30  
Balanced panel  LSDVC  LSDVC  LSDVC  





Moreover, Blundell et al. (2001), reviewing developments to 
improve on the relatively poor performance of the standard 
one-step difference GMM estimator for highly autoregressive 
panel series, provided Monte Carlo simulation comparison 
between one-step difference and a new estimator, denoted 
system GMM, that relies on relatively mild restrictions on the 
initial condition process, and made an application to a simple 
panel Cobb-Douglas production function for US data, showing 
that system GMM has substantial asymptotic efficiency gains, 
as it not only greatly improves the precision but also greatly 
reduces the finite sample bias.  
Soto (2007) analysed through Monte Carlo simulations the 
properties of various GMM and other estimators when the 
number of individuals is small, as typical in country studies. He 
found that the system GMM estimator has a lower bias and 
higher efficiency than all the other estimators analysed, 
including the standard one-step difference GMM estimators. 
We have an unbalanced panel with T = 25: thus, we have 
implemented LSDV and AB GMM (one-step difference and 
system) estimators.  
Moreover, we consider the useful advices provided by 
Roodman (2009a, 2009b) in order to make appropriate 
specification choices for AB GMM and correctly face up to the 
econometric problems which may emerge, particularly 




suggests: a) to use orthogonal deviations, in order to maximize 
sample size; b) to put every regressor into the instrument 
matrix: if a regressor is strictly exogenous, it is inserted as a 
single column; if it is predetermined but not strictly exogenous 
(such as our regressors), lags 1 and deeper are used in GMM-
style; if it is endogenous, lags 2 and deeper are used in GMM-
style; c) to pay attention in evaluating the results of 
autocorrelation and endogeneity tests, as a small number of 
cross-country observations makes Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation not very reliable and too many instruments 





2.6.2. The Econometric Results 
Before discussing our results, we recapitulate in Table 4 the 
main predictions about the role of globalisation and 










Table 4. Expected shifts of the Beveridge Curve: institutional variables, globalization 
and technological progress. 
 
 Expected Shifts 
Tax wedge Outward shift: Nickell et al. (2003) 
Unemployment 
benefits 




Outward or inward shift: Nickell et al. (2003) 
Bargaining 
coordination 
Inward shift: Nickell et al. (2003) 
Union density Outward shift: Nickell et al. (2003) 
Globalisation Outward shift: Nickell and Bell (1995); Song and Webster (2003) 
Technological 
progress 
Outward shift (creative-destruction effect: Aghion and Howitt, 1994, 
Postel-Vinay, 2002: but inward shift in the short-run?) or Inward shift 
(capitalization effect: Pissarides, 1990; Mortensens and Pissarides, 1998; 
Pissarides and Vallanti, 2007) 
Capital 
deepening 
Inward shift (short-run) and Outward shift (medium- to long-run): 
Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) 
TFP growth Outward shift (short-run) and Inward shift (medium- to long-run): 
Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) 
 
Table A.1 shows the LSDV estimation results, which confirm 
the existence of a Beveridge Curve for the countries considered 
and reveal a significant positive effect of both current and 
lagged technological progress, which tends to shift the curve 
outwards through the creative destruction effect, whereas the 
coefficients of the globalisation index are not significant. 
Among the institutional variables, just union density and 
bargaining coordination are significant and have the expected 
impact on unemployment. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
indicates the absence of autocorrelation, whereas the Hausman 




In Table A.2 one-step difference GMM estimation results are 
considered. We notice that the Beveridge trade-off is again 
confirmed, but now a significant positive impact of the lagged 
values of both globalisation and technological progress comes 
out. Furthermore, employment protection legislation shows a 
negative effect on unemployment: stricter legislation shifts the 
Beveridge Curve inwards. Interestingly, the previously 
significant inflow rate wholly loses significance, shedding 
doubts on the specification proposed in Nickell et al. (2003). 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is not significant, 
and Sargan and Hansen tests for endogeneity produce very 
high p-values. For the latter, as pointed out by Roodman, this is 
a potential signal of trouble
9
. 
One-step system GMM estimation results are presented in 
Table A.3. In terms of Beveridge Curve, globalisation and 
technological progress, these results are similar to those 
achieved by difference GMM estimation, whereas among 
institutional variables coordination bargaining and 
unemployment benefits are significant and have the expected 
impact on unemployment. Capital deepening gains however 
significance, while TFP growth heavily loses it. The inflow 
 
9 Too many instruments can overfit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their 
endogenous components. Thus, we have to be beware of taking comfort in a Hansen 








rate is again insignificant. Also, higher employment protection 
legislation shifts now the Beveridge Curve outwards. Tests for 
correlation and endogeneity confirm the previous results as 
well, and Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of 
instrument subsets proves the validity of the additional 
instruments in system GMM.   
Tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 contain similar estimates, which 
however exclude the institutional variables from the model. We 
can notice that including the labour market institutions help to 
improve considerably the estimates, as technical progress, 
globalisation and capital deepening coefficients gain 
significance. Also RESET tests performed for the LSDV 
regressions show that specifications omitting institutional 
variables are not well-behaved.  
Summing up, we notice some common results across the 
various estimation methods: a) a Beveridge trade-off is actually 
found; b) institutional variables are mostly not significant; c) 
lagged values of technological progress have a significant 
positive impact on unemployment and shift the Beveridge 
Curve outwards (creative destruction effect). Thus, the 
empirical analysis does not support the predictions of Postel-
Vinay‟s simulations about the short-run adjustment of 
unemployment to technological progress. Indeed, the 
coefficient of current and lagged technological progress have 




estimations current technological progress is not significant at 
all.  
However, there are some different points as well: a) the 
vacancy rate coefficient is considerably higher in GMM 
estimates (0.231 in difference GMM, 0.251 in system GMM) 
than in LSDV (0.159); b) in GMM estimates, the position of 
the Beveridge Curve is influenced by lagged values of 
globalisation as well: the process of economic integration has a 
positive impact on unemployment and shifts the Curve 
outwards; c) in system GMM estimation, the coefficients of 
capital deepening are significant and have the expected sign: its 
effect on unemployment is negative in the short-run and turns 
positive in the long-run, as predicted by Pissarides and 
Vallanti.   
Thus, technological progress does not reveal any sign reversal 
as would be implied by the hypothesis that the model behaves 
differently in the short- and in the long-run. On the other hand, 
for TFP and capital stock the sign reversal that was suggested 
by Pissarides and Vallanti‟s model is actually verified. 
Moreover, endogeneity is a non trivial problem in our model, 
as shown by the overidentifying restrictions tests, by the loss of 
significance of the inflow rate in the GMM models, and by the 
changing signs of various institutional factors. This leads to the 
conclusion that endogeneity is underestimated in the literature, 




We have gathered sufficient evidence according to which 
globalisation and technological progress have significant 
effects on the Beveridge Curve. However, it could be thought 
that these impacts are not economically significant. We address 
this issue in Table A.7, A.8 and A.9, showing the percent 
changes in the dependent variable brought about by a unit 
standard deviation change in a given independent variable. In 
this case we focus only on steady-state solutions. We notice 
that technological progress and capital deepening have a very 
strong impact in all the estimations: the impact of capital 
deepening is more pronounced at the beginning and end of the 
period, whereas technological progress has constant effects 
over time. Globalisation has a lower and more discontinuous in 
time impact compared to technological progress, whereas the 
more significant institutional variables present very different 
values depending on the estimation method. In system GMM 
their impact is not large. 
Thus, we conclude that the impact of technological progress 
and, to some extent, capital deepening on the Beveridge Curve 
is not only statistically, but also economically significant.  
 
2.7. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we considered the economies of nineteen OECD 




existence of a OECD Beveridge Curve and to investigate 
whether and how technological progress and globalisation 
affect the Curve. To the best of our knowledge, although in the 
literature various hints are dropped to the effect that these two 
factors should influence the unemployment-vacancies trade-off 
(even if there is not unanimity on the sign of their respective 
impacts), no formal tests of this kind had been carried out so 
far.  
We followed Judson and Owen‟s suggestions and, considering 
also Blundell et al. findings, used three different estimation 
methods, which turn out consistent with our (unbalanced) 
panel. We can sum up the main results as follows: a) we find 
largely favourable evidence for the existence of a Beveridge 
Curve; b) lagged values of technological progress impact 
positively on unemployment and shift the Beveridge Curve 
outwards, producing evidence in support of the creative 
destruction effect; c) lagged values of the globalisation index 
have a positive impact on unemployment, also shifting the 
Beveridge Curve outwards. However...; d) a critical 
econometric issue, extremely undervalued by the previous 
papers, is represented by endogeneity, as consistently shown by 









Table A.1. LSDV estimation (dependent variable: natural 
log of current unemployment) 
 Coefficients p-values 
cons 0.599 0.300 
uit-1 0.966 0.000 
uit-2 -0.296 0.000 
vit -0.159 0.000 
vit-1 0.064 0.074 
infit 0.099 0.004 
infit-1 0.027 0.345 
globit 0.052 0.387 
globit-1 0.088 0.135 
tpit 1.755 0.000 
tpit-1 1.168 0.021 
kit -0.169 0.173 
kit-1 0.076 0.467 
tfpit 4.022 0.006 
tfpit-1 -4.728 0.000 
nrwit 0.202 0.502 
nrwit-1 0.463 0.134 
eplit -0.038 0.308 
eplit-1 0.020 0.569 
coit -0.280 0.000 
coit-1 -0.208 0.004 
udit 2.120 0.002 
udit-1 -2.313 0.001 
tit -0.256 0.502 
tit-1 -0.253 0.528 
R-squared 0.943  
Breusch-Pagan  test (P-
value) 
0.358  
Durbin Watson statistic (P-
value) 
1.934  
Hausman test (P-value) 0.000  






Table A.2. One-step difference GMM estimation 
(dependent variable: natural log of current unemployment) 
 Coefficients p-values 
uit-1 1.109 0.000 
uit-2 -0.328 0.003 
vit -0.231 0.003 
vit-1 0.185 0.003 
infit 0.040 0.371 
infit-1 0.006 0.895 
globit -0.114 0.415 
globit-1 0.278 0.001 
tpit 1.284 0.442 
tpit-1 2.467 0.022 
kit 0.048 0.940 
kit-1 -0.126 0.829 
tfpit 5.263 0.397 
tfpit-1 -13.035 0.011 
nrwit 0.307 0.758 
nrwit-1 0.331 0.655 
eplit -0.237 0.002 
eplit-1 0.130 0.142 
coit -0.285 0.096 
coit-1 0.275 0.014 
udit 1.850 0.167 
udit-1 -1.460 0.211 
tit 0.735 0.620 
tit-1 -1.744 0.189 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.027  
AR (2) (P-value) 0.125  
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.981  














Table A.3. System GMM estimation (dependent variable: 
natural log of current unemployment) 
 Coefficients p-values 
cons 3.350 0.431 
uit-1 1.147 0.000 
uit-2 -0.391 0.003 
vit -0.251 0.000 
vit-1 0.122 0.028 
infit -0.029 0.537 
infit-1 -0.017 0.701 
globit -0.146 0.177 
globit-1 0.197 0.030 
tpit -0.179 0.851 
tpit-1 2.370 0.033 
kit -2.890 0.039 
kit-1 2.825 0.043 
tfpit 3.659 0.418 
tfpit-1 -4.268 0.382 
nrwit 0.873 0.017 
nrwit-1 -0.563 0.189 
eplit -0.098 0.138 
eplit-1 0.109 0.046 
coit -0.248 0.013 
coit-1 0.288 0.000 
udit 0.300 0.859 
udit-1 -0.780 0.641 
tit 0.103 0.911 
tit-1 -0.899 0.223 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.010  
AR (2) (P-value) 0.082  
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.419  
Hansen Test (P-value) 1.000  













Table A.4. LSDV estimation, no institutional variables 
(dependent variable: natural log of current unemployment) 
 
 Coefficients p-values 
cons 0.431 0.495 
uit-1 1.036 0.000 
uit-2 -0.368 0.000 
vit -0.161 0.003 
vit-1 0.067 0.221 
infit 0.104 0.024 
infit-1 0.023 0.556 
globit 0.027 0.795 
globit-1 0.100 0.120 
tpit 1.441 0.070 
tpit-1 2.671 0.019 
kit -0.275 0.013 
kit-1 0.060 0.250 
tfpit 2.634 0.062 
tfpit-1 -1.570 0.410 
R-squared 0.935  
Breusch-Pagan  Test (P-
value) 
0.145  
Durbin Watson statistic (P-
value) 
1.938  























Table A.5. One-step difference GMM estimation, no 




 Coefficients p-values 
uit-1 1.257 0.000 
uit-2 -0.470 0.019 
vit -0.239 0.044 
vit-1 0.188 0.027 
infit -0.016 0.862 
infit-1 0.035 0.642 
globit 0.149 0.374 
globit-1 0.077 0.582 
tpit 2.834 0.174 
tpit-1 8.420 0.758 
kit 0.144 0.867 
kit-1 -0.093 0.894 
tfpit 13.868 0.106 
tfpit-1 -20.533 0.041 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.063  
AR (2) (P-value) 0.798  
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.983  























Table A.6. System GMM estimation,  no institutional 




 Coefficients p-values 
Cons 12.324 0.007 
uit-1 1.162 0.000 
uit-2 -0.434 0.000 
vit -0.113 0.257 
vit-1 0.088 0.156 
infit -0.051 0.293 
infit-1 0.040 0.450 
globit 0.050 0.789 
globit-1 -0.011 0.954 
tpit -1.174 0.255 
tpit-1 1.138 0.378 
kit -6.368 0.037 
kit-1 6.293 0.039 
tfpit 4.340 0.515 
tfpit-1 -6.800 0.328 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.019  
AR (2) (P-value) 0.149  
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.212  
Hansen Test (P-value) 1.000  


















Table A.7. Percent changes in unemployment rate, LSDV 
estimation 
 
year glob tp k tfp co epl 
1980 0.14 0.33 -0.52 -0.01 -0.88 -0.02 
1981 0.09 0.31 -0.49 -0.01 -0.99 -0.02 
1982 0.10 0.30 -0.45 -0.01 -1.11 -0.02 
1983 0.12 0.30 -0.42 -0.01 -0.96 -0.02 
1984 0.10 0.30 -0.39 -0.01 -0.82 -0.01 
1985 0.09 0.30 -0.35 -0.01 -0.70 -0.02 
1986 0.09 0.29 -0.31 -0.01 -0.60 -0.02 
1987 0.06 0.30 -0.28 -0.01 -0.54 -0.02 
1988 0.09 0.29 -0.24 -0.01 -0.36 -0.02 
1989 0.14 0.28 -0.18 -0.01 -0.19 -0.01 
1990 0.10 0.31 -0.12 -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 
1991 0.07 0.31 -0.03 -0.04 -0.30 -0.01 
1992 0.04 0.33 -0.02 -0.01 -0.48 -0.01 
1993 0.05 0.34 -0.07 -0.01 -0.48 -0.01 
1994 0.04 0.34 -0.11 -0.01 -0.48 -0.01 
1995 0.05 0.34 -0.15 -0.01 -0.48 -0.01 
1996 0.06 0.33 -0.19 -0.01 -0.48 -0.01 
1997 0.06 0.29 -0.24 -0.01 -0.48 -0.02 
1998 0.07 0.30 -0.29 -0.01 -0.48 -0.02 
1999 0.07 0.30 -0.33 -0.01 -0.48 -0.02 
2000 0.06 0.28 -0.38 -0.01 -0.48 -0.02 
2001 0.06 0.27 -0.43 -0.01 -0.48 -0.02 
2002 0.08 0.28 -0.48 -0.01 -0.48 -0.02 
2003 0.09 0.31 -0.53 -0.01 -0.48 -0.02 












Table A.8. Percent changes in unemployment rate, One-
step difference GMM 
 
year glob tp k tfp co epl 
1980 0.24 0.64 -0.66 -0.15 -0.03 -0.22 
1981 0.15 0.59 -0.61 -0.20 -0.03 -0.22 
1982 0.18 0.59 -0.57 -0.15 -0.03 -0.21 
1983 0.22 0.59 -0.54 -0.13 -0.03 -0.21 
1984 0.18 0.58 -0.49 -0.12 -0.03 -0.13 
1985 0.15 0.58 -0.45 -0.14 -0.02 -0.16 
1986 0.15 0.56 -0.39 -0.17 -0.02 -0.16 
1987 0.10 0.57 -0.35 -0.14 -0.02 -0.16 
1988 0.15 0.55 -0.30 -0.10 -0.01 -0.17 
1989 0.24 0.55 -0.23 -0.14 -0.01 -0.11 
1990 0.18 0.60 -0.15 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 
1991 0.12 0.60 -0.04 -0.72 -0.01 -0.09 
1992 0.07 0.65 -0.03 -0.20 -0.01 -0.08 
1993 0.10 0.66 -0.08 -0.11 -0.01 -0.09 
1994 0.08 0.65 -0.14 -0.15 -0.01 -0.08 
1995 0.09 0.65 -0.19 -0.10 -0.01 -0.13 
1996 0.10 0.63 -0.24 -0.09 -0.01 -0.13 
1997 0.10 0.57 -0.30 -0.17 -0.01 -0.17 
1998 0.12 0.58 -0.37 -0.16 -0.01 -0.17 
1999 0.11 0.59 -0.42 -0.10 -0.01 -0.17 
2000 0.10 0.54 -0.48 -0.14 -0.01 -0.17 
2001 0.11 0.52 -0.55 -0.14 -0.01 -0.17 
2002 0.13 0.54 -0.61 -0.10 -0.01 -0.17 
2003 0.15 0.60 -0.67 -0.08 -0.01 -0.17 












Table A.9. Percent changes in unemployment rate, System 
GMM estimation 
 
year glob tp k tfp co epl 
1980 0.07 0.33 -0.49 -0.01 0.10 0.02 
1981 0.04 0.31 -0.46 -0.01 0.11 0.02 
1982 0.05 0.31 -0.43 -0.01 0.12 0.02 
1983 0.06 0.31 -0.40 -0.01 0.11 0.02 
1984 0.05 0.30 -0.37 -0.01 0.09 0.01 
1985 0.04 0.30 -0.33 -0.01 0.08 0.02 
1986 0.04 0.30 -0.30 -0.01 0.07 0.01 
1987 0.03 0.30 -0.26 -0.01 0.06 0.01 
1988 0.04 0.29 -0.22 -0.01 0.04 0.02 
1989 0.07 0.29 -0.17 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
1990 0.05 0.32 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
1991 0.03 0.31 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.01 
1992 0.02 0.34 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.01 
1993 0.03 0.35 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.01 
1994 0.02 0.34 -0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.01 
1995 0.03 0.34 -0.14 -0.01 0.05 0.01 
1996 0.03 0.33 -0.18 -0.01 0.05 0.01 
1997 0.03 0.30 -0.23 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
1998 0.03 0.30 -0.27 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
1999 0.03 0.31 -0.31 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
2000 0.03 0.28 -0.36 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
2001 0.03 0.27 -0.41 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
2002 0.04 0.28 -0.45 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
2003 0.04 0.31 -0.50 -0.01 0.05 0.02 












Legend of tables 
The sample relates to 1980-2004 period and 19 countries, for a 
sum total of 475 observations.  
The dependent variable is always    , the natural log of the 
unemployment rate, where i = 1, …, N stands for the country, 
and t = 1, …, T stands for a given year.  
Among the independent variables, v is the natural log of 
vacancy rate, inf the natural log of the inflow rate, glob the 
natural log of the globalisation index, tp the technological 
progress, k the capital deepening index, tfp the total factor 
productivity, nrw the unemployment benefits index, epl the 
employment protection legislation index, co the bargaining 
coordination index, ud the union density index, t the total tax 
wedge.  
In the model we have included yearly and country dummies 
and linear and quadratic trends, not shown in the interest of 
parsimony. The p-values belong to the z-statistics (akin to t-
ratios) for the regression coefficients. 
In Tables A.1 and A.4, R-squared is the coefficient of 
determination, Breusch-Pagan test is the test of residual 
contemporaneous correlation independence, Durbin Watson 
statistic is the test statistic of first-order autocorrelation in the 
residuals, Hausman test tests the exogeneity of regressors and 





In Table A.2, A.3, A.5 and A.6, AB(1) and AB(2) are the 
Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order serial 
correlation (distributed as a normal), Sargan and Hansen tests 
are tests of overidentifying restrictions that detect the 
exogeneity of the instruments as a group, and D-i-H Test is the 
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Chapter III. The Italian Beveridge Curve: a 
Regional Analysis 
3.1. Introduction 
After treating in the previous chapter the effectiveness of 
labour market matching across OECD countries, now we focus 
on the Italian labour market. There are not many studies that 
have analyzed the Beveridge Curve in Italy, likely because of 
the lack of official data on vacancies. Moreover, no previous 
study has focused specifically on a regional level analysis of 
the Beveridge Curve. This chapter aims at filling this gap of the 
literature using quarterly data for the 1992-2009 period. In 
particular, the ISAE labour scarcity indicator, which is 
available for all the regions, is used to build regional vacancy 
rates. Like in Destefanis and Fonseca (2007), we investigate 
the impact on matching efficiency of the development in the 
number of so-called atypical jobs (both part-time and 
temporary). Differently from these authors, as well from most 
of the previous literature, we explicitly allow for the role of 
some direct mismatch indicators. 
Furthermore, drawing inspiration from some studies about 
other countries, we investigate the existence of a significant 
spatial inter-dependence between Italian regional labour 




unemployed workers and from job openings in neighbouring 
regions impact on the labour market performance of each 
region. Finally, we explore the impact of the current Great 
Recession on the Beveridge Curve. We do this in this chapter 
(and not in the previous chapter on OECD countries) because 
cross-country data for recent years are not widely available. At 
the same time, our regional set-up allows us to appraise how 
different labour markets have reacted to the current aggregate 
depression. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a short 
description of the Beveridge Curve, largely referring to 
Chapter I for in-depth analysis; in Section 3 we overview the 
empirical literature on the Beveridge Curve in Italy, whereas in 
Section 4 we present some contributions from other European 
countries on the existence of spillover effects in regional labour 
market matching; Section 5 describes the empirical 
specification and the data we used; Section 6 presents our 
results, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
3.2. The Beveridge Curve: a Brief Reference 
The Beveridge Curve is formally defined as the path formed by 
all those vacancy and unemployment rate combinations, where 
unemployment is stable, i.e. where the inflow into 




matching process on the labour market, the higher the level of 
vacant jobs, the lower the level of unemployment, as the 
probability of finding a job increases. 
Thus, the Beveridge Curve shows the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the vacancy rate and can provide a 
synthetic description of developments in the matching process. 
Movements along the Curve (i.e. where vacancies and 
unemployment move in different directions) reflect cyclical 
fluctuations in economic activity. An outward shift of the 
Curve, where vacancies and unemployment increase 
simultaneously, might indicate a deterioration in the matching 
process owing to structural factors such as inadequately 
functioning labour market institutions. Conversely, an inward 
shift of the Curve may indicate an improvement in the 
matching process. For a more exhaustive theoretical treatment 
and derivation of the Beveridge Curve, we refer to Chapter I 
(sections 2 to 4 in particular). 
 
3.3. Unemployment and Vacancies in Italy: the Empirical 
Literature 
In Italy there are no official data on vacancies
10
. However, 
there are two ongoing surveys allowing the empirical appraisal 
 
10 At least, this was true until last year: ISTAT has now started producing some 
official data. This is anyway irrelevant for the present analysis, as these data are only 




of the relationship between vacancies and unemployment at a 
business-cycle frequency.  
The CSA (Centro di Studi Aziendali, Florence) and the ISFOL 
(Istituto per lo Sviluppo della Formazione Professionale dei 
Lavoratori, Rome) carry out a quarterly survey on the help-
wanted advertisements published in some important daily 
newspapers. These data, however, are not available on a 
regional basis, but only for a restricted number of macro-areas 
(three - North, Centre and South - for a lengthy time period, 
and four - North-West, North-East, Centre and South - in more 
recent years). 
The other data source relates to the quarterly business survey 
undertaken by ISAE (Istituto di Studi e Indagine Economica, 
formerly ISCO, Istituto per la Congiuntura Economica) in 
manufacturing, and is also available on a regional basis. 
Among other things, firms are asked whether the scarcity of 
labour prevents them from expanding their activity. Under 
some assumptions (which will be examined in detail in section 
5 of this chapter), the replies to this question allow the 
construction of a vacancy rate indicator. 
Furthermore, until 1999 it was also possible to utilise another 
(administrative) source on a regional basis: the data from the 
Italian Ministry of Labour (Ministero del Lavoro e della 
Previdenza Sociale) relating to the vacancy notices posted by 




already had actually decided upon the hiring). Unfortunately 
these data are no longer available. 
Perhaps because of the absence of official data on vacancies, 
not many studies have examined the nature and evolution of 
the Beveridge Curve for the Italian labour market.  
 
3.3.1. The  First Studies of the Italian Beveridge Curve 
Sestito (1988) and Bragato (1990) use the ISFOL-CSA data on 
vacancies, and find a significant relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies only in the presence of a growing 
linear trend. Bragato (1990) also finds a significant Beveridge 
Curve for the North and the Centre, but not for the South. A 
significant difference between the Southern labour market and 
the rest of the country also shows up in Sestito (1991), who 
analyses Italian labour market between 1967 and 1988 and uses 
the data from the ISAE survey as proxy for vacancies. In this 
case, nevertheless, no linear trend has to be included in the 
estimates to find a significant relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies. This analysis shows that the 
worsening performance of the Italian labour market can be 
mainly interpreted as a shift of the Beveridge Curve rather than 
in terms of a reduction of the supply of vacancies along a given 
Beveridge Curve. The analysis in Di Monte (1992) is based on 




Labour data on vacancies. The main difference in the results 
obtained by Di Monte relative to previous evidence is that a 
significant Beveridge Curve also shows up for the South.  
 
3.3.2. The Latest Empirical Analyses 
More recent evidence is provided by Mocavini and Paliotta 
(2000), Brandolini and Cipollone (2001) and Destefanis and 
Fonseca (2004, 2007).  
Utilising the ISFOL-CSA data for the 1980‟s and the 1990‟s, 
Mocavini and Paliotta (2000) provide an exploratory analysis 
of the Beveridge Curve, examining the trend of the 
unemployment-vacancies relationship over time. First, they 
find a largely favourable evidence for the existence of an 
aggregate Beveridge curve, which in a first period (1980-1983) 
shifts downwards, subsequently (1984-1987 and 1993-1999) 
upwards. Whereas the vacancy rate showed rises and falls, the 
unemployment rate always increases except in 1990-1991 and 
in 1999. Therefore, the Curve seems to reflect mainly the 
movements of vacancies and the help-wanted advertisements 
index seems to anticipate the business cycle. This feature also 
comes out in the subsequent step of the analysis, focused on the 
three macroareas (North, Centre, South).  
More precisely, help-wanted advertisements seem to anticipate 




vacancy rate starts declining in 1990 in a situation of economic 
growth, whereas the unemployment rate, that immediately 
reacts to the crisis, starts going up only in 1992. Before, the 
vacancy rate started rising during the period of recession, 
followed just two years later by the decrease of the 
unemployment rate. Thus, it appears that vacancies anticipate 
the business cycle by two years.  
Furthermore, comparing the three macroareas, Mocavini and 
Paliotta find that, whereas the Centre reflects essentially the 
national trend, a strong dualism between the North and the 
South comes out. While in the Northern labour market they 
verify, except in 1992-1994 period, a substantial negative 
relationship between unemployment and vacancies, 
characterised by a reduction of the former and a growth in the 
latter, in the South there have been an uncertain movement of 
vacancies, characterised by repeated rises and falls of the 
number of the help-wanted advertisements index, and a 
constantly high unemployment rate. Therefore, Mocavini and 
Paliotta argue that, whereas the Northern labour market is 
characterised by frictional imperfections and by a Beveridge 
Curve driven by movements in vacancies, the Southern labour 
market reflects an economic stagnation where unemployment 
includes a strong structural component and the Beveridge 





Mocavini and Paliotta‟s study is important inasmuch as it drew 
again attention to the existence of an Italian Beveridge Curve,  
highlighting the strong heterogeneity between the Northern and 
the Southern labour markets, which could be a driving factor of 
the shifts in the aggregate Beveridge Curve. 
Brandolini and Cipollone (2001) focus their attention on the 
analysis of territorial, sectoral and skill mismatch, trying to 
prove its existence in the Italian labour market in 1970-2000 
period using different mismatch indicators. The territorial 
mismatch is determined by different growth and development 
rates between the regions of a same country: basically the 
vacancies are not located where unemployed are and strong 
rigidities limit the productive factors mobility and the 
possibility to reduce the mismatch as well. The sectoral 
mismatch stems from wage, productivity and technology 
differences between the different productive sectors. Finally, 
the skill mismatch refers to the mismatch between the skills the 
workers supply and the skills employers demand. 
The first mismatch indicator Brandolini and Cipollone 
consider, M1, is the turbulence index by Jackman et al. (1991), 
based upon the number of workers that have changed sector
11
 
























where Eit is the employment in sector i and in period t, and 
         is the total employment. The second indicator that 
they consider is the labour reallocation indicator by Lilien 
(1982), which is closely related to the turbulence index. It 
measures the relative dispersion of the growth rates across 
sectors, 
















































While these two measures of mismatch rely on the 
occupational growth, the last indicator considered, M3, 
suggested by Jackman et al. (1991) as well, is based on the 
variance of the relative unemployment rates, 

















where uit  is the unemployment rate in sector i and in period t 
and ut is the national unemployment rate. Under the hypothesis 
that the latter reflects some notion of equilibrium, then 
mismatch is measured as the distance between actual 
unemployment rates and equilibrium unemployment rate.  
By using these three indicators, Brandolini and Cipollone 
estimate the different types of mismatch and find out that: a) 
sectoral mismatch does not vary significantly; b) a higher 
unemployment rate of skilled workers shows up until 1992, 
while later and especially from 1995 Italy follows the 




unemployment among unskilled workers. On the whole, skill 
mismatch shows a very moderate increase in the second half of 
the 1990's; c) regarding regional mismatch, there have been 
strong fluctuations, with some divergences among the various 
indicators.  
Indeed, M1 and M2 highlight that, after an increasing trend in 
the 1980‟s, regional mismatch seems to fall suddenly at the end 
of the same decade and keeps on having a negative trend 
during the 1990‟s except in 1993. However, the other indicator, 
M3, depicts a completely different situation, where regional 
mismatch rises at the end of the 1980‟s and during the 1990‟s. 
Brandolini and Cipollone try to play down the strong 
divergence between the results by minimising the rise of 
regional mismatch as measured by M3. They first consider the 
fact that the unemployment rate often, especially in the 
Southern regions, tends to rise as the labour demand rises, that 
is as many discouraged workers, that previously have not 
looked for a job actively and, thus, have not been classified as 
unemployed, tend to enter the labour market; then, they 
consider the possibility to justify the regional dispersion of the 
unemployment rates during the periods of economic growth 
through the lag of the business cycle in the South compared to 
the North, which gets the unemployment rates to keep on rising 
in the Southern regions when they are already going down. So, 




just partially solved, on the other hand they consider reasons of 
the regional mismatch deeper than the frictions in the matching 
process, such as the great difficulty or unwillingness of the 
Southern inhabitants to move to the Northern regions where 
vacancies are open, or the disinclination of the firms to settle in 
the South. 
More interestingly for our purposes, Brandolini and Cipollone 
proceed to analyse mismatch within a Beveridge Curve 
framework. Using the ISFOL-CSA indicator for vacancies, 
they examine the behaviour of the Curve over time, under the 
hypothesis that its outward shifts can be interpreted as an 
increase in the mismatch. This kind of analysis suggests that 
mismatch increase during the 1980‟s. Finally, Brandolini and 
Cipollone construct a job matching function à la Pissarides 
(1990, 2000) in order to appraise the impact of some of the 
structural changes which seem to emerge from their previous 
analyses. More precisely, they consider two factors: 1) a 
possible rise in the inputs of the matching technology, 
considering the increase in the participation rates from 1995 to 
2000; 2) the possibility of a complete process of institutional 
reform of the market, which, inputs being equal, raised the 
matching efficiency. Utilising a measure of vacancies relying 
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where Ut-1 is the lagged rate of unemployment and LSt-1 is the 
lagged share of firms which are experiencing labour scarcity, 
whereas et is an error term. As a proxy for hirings, Brandolini 
and Cipollone elaborate data from the ISTAT Labour Force 
Survey, derived from transition matrices and recall questions. 
We stress that this kind of information is not readily available 
at a regional level. 
From the OLS and IV estimation of (4) in the 1979-2000 
period, it turns out that: a) matches react more to the demand-
side than to the supply-side, as shown by the fact that c is twice 
higher than b; b) a significant and quick improvement of 
matching efficiency takes place in the last decade.   
Destefanis and Fonseca (2004) utilise a matching theory 
approach (see Chapter I, sections 2 and 3 in particular) in order 
to analyse the links between territorial and skill mismatch. 
Exploiting the resemblance between the matching function and 
a production function and re-parameterising the matching 
function as a Beveridge Curve, they carry out estimates of the 
Beveridge Curve for the Italian economy and for the three 
macroareas through stochastic frontier techniques. 
They use vacancy data from three different sources (ISFOL-
CSA, ISAE, Ministry of Labour), examining carefully the 




determinants of the efficiency as regressors and comparing 
directly the performance of the three above-mentioned vacancy 
indicators. The main aim is to produce technical efficiency 
scores through a within-effect technique and to utilise their 
variance as measure of the mismatch in the labour market 
considered. Their results first highlight a largely favourable 
evidence to the existence of an aggregate Beveridge Curve in 
the 1990s, and across the main territorial areas as well, 
whatever indicator is used. Furthermore, from the comparison 
of the different areas and of the high- and low-skilled segments 
of the labour market, it turns out that the imbalance between 
skilled labour demand and supply is not able to explain the 
huge differences between the Southern labour market and the 
rest of the country. Instead, it is the poor performance of the 
Southern labour market to heighten in that area of the country 
the efficiency differentials between high- and low-skilled 
segments.  
Considering quarterly data over the period 1992-2001, 
Destefanis and Fonseca (2007) use a matching theory approach 
to assess the impact on the Italian labour market of the so-
called 1997 Treu Act (Legge Treu) as well, which considerably 
eased the regulation of temporary work and favoured its 
growth in Italy. They reparameterise the matching function as a 
Beveridge Curve and estimate it as a production frontier using 




differences in matching efficiency between the South and the 
rest of the country. The Treu Act appears to have improved 
matching efficiency in the North of the country, particularly for 
skilled workers, but also to have strengthened competition 
among skilled and unskilled workers, especially in the South, 




















































































































































In Table 1, we have summed up some important characteristics 
of the studies examined in this section. The lack of studies on 
regional (NUTS2) data clearly comes out, as well as the 
prevalent lack of analysis for the mismatch indicators. Only 
Destefanis and Fonseca have proceeded to the computation of 
efficiency scores, which could be a useful tool in the study of 
regional differences and mismatch. From the bulk of the Italian 
studies, the latter dimension appears indeed of paramount 
importance. As is apparent from the last-but-one column of the 
table, there is another distinctive lack in the Italian literature. 
Basically, the relevance of territorial spillover effects is never 
considered. The relevance of this lack will become more 
apparent in the light of the papers surveyed in the following 
section. 
 
3.4. Matching and Regional Spillovers: a Literature 
Overview 
In the most recent international literature concerning labour 
market matching, a growing number of contributions have 
focused their attention on regional analysis taking into account 
spillover effects with neighbouring regions.  
Burgess and Profit (2001) estimate matching functions for 303 
travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) in a ten year (1985-1995) panel 




flows in Britain. More precisely, they first estimate a basic 
matching function through different models (pooled OLS, fixed 
effects regression, three-stage GLS), finding that a strong 
relationship exists in the data between job formation and 
unemployment and vacancies (and the matching function 
exhibits decreasing returns to scale). Then, they investigate 
spatial dependence in local labour markets, estimating by 
three-stage GLS an augmented matching function where the 
spatial spillover variables are specified as a weighted sum of 
the unemployed and vacancies in the neighbouring TTWAs,  
and find strong evidence of spillover effects between local 
labour markets, including significant negative congestion 
effects in matching: conditional on local conditions, high 
unemployment in neighbouring areas raises the number of local 
filled vacancies but lowers the local outflow from 
unemployment.  
Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003) consider annual data for the 14 
Finnish regions from 1988 to 1997 using the frontier approach. 
They include in the estimates a linear trend and allow for some 
potential determinants of inefficiency: specifically, they 
incorporate explanatory variables directly in the (in)efficiency 
term so that the (in)efficiency can vary across regions and over 
time. Firstly they estimate a traditional matching function with 
the explanatory variables included directly in the equation, 




Secondly they estimate the stochastic matching frontier, where 
the explanatory variables do not appear directly in the model 
but are included in the mean function of the truncated error 
term, using maximum likelihood according to Battese and 
Coelli (1995) approach. Among the explanatory variables they 
include the average unemployment and vacancy rates of the 
neighbouring regions, that enter significantly and with the 
expected signs in the estimates (the average unemployment rate 
of the neighbouring regions has a negative impact on 
efficiency, whereas the average vacancy rate has a positive 
impact). 
Ahtonen (2005) considers monthly data for 173 Finnish Local 
Labour Office (LLO) areas over a 12-year period between 
January 1991 and August 2002 in order to study spatial aspects 
in local labour markets from the perspective of a matching 
approach. The basic matching function is extended (as in 
Burgess and Profit) to account for spatial spillovers between 
the local labour markets. Estimating by pooled OLS and fixed 
effects model, they find that Finnish labour markets suffer from 
a strong congestion effect among job seekers, and spatial 
spillovers even strengthen the congestion: an open vacancy is 
filled much easier than a job seeker is employed. Then, they 
examine also the role of population density in the matching 
process, adding it as an interaction dummy variable in the 




remarkable lower in dense areas than elsewhere, which 
indicates that mismatch is a problem in the local labour 
markets with high population density. 
Kosfeld (2006) considers monthly data from December 1997 to 
December 2004 for 439 German districts in order to address 
the issues of regional spillovers and spatial heterogeneity in the 
matching of workers and employers in the unified Germany. 
More precisely he considers 180 regional labour markets (133 
in the western and 47 in the eastern part of Germany) using 
data on job commuters across German districts. He estimates 
the usual spatially augmented matching function both through 
pooled OLS and a spatial seemingly unrelated regressions 
(spatial SUR) model that allows for temporal and spatial 
dependencies. More specifically, he first focuses on the 
aggregate matching function, then on West-East regimes of the 
matching function separately, finally on the regional matching 
functions (considering 12 macroregions) in order to assess the 
importance of regional mismatch. He finds that: a) the 
significance of spatial externalities in job matching is clearly 
confirmed; b) West and East regimes of the matching process 
differ mainly with respect to the strength of spatial interaction: 
larger response coefficients of the spatial lag variables reflect 
the higher regional mobility of Eastern German workers; c) 
conditional on regional labour markets structures and tightness, 




business cycle fluctuations. Although regional mismatch varies 
over the business cycle as well, it can only explain a relatively 




Table 2. The international literature on spillovers  
 



































From Table 2, the high significance of spillover effects is well 
apparent, highlighting the relevance of this lack in the Italian 
literature. Because of the lack of regional data on hirings 
already pointed out in section 3, it is not possible to carry out 
an analysis of spillovers in the Italian case within a matching 
function. However, reparameterising the matching function as 
a Beveridge Curve along the lines of Destefanis and Fonseca 
(2004, 2007), it will still be possible to assess the relevance of 





3.5. The Econometric Analysis: Empirical specification and 
Data 
As above mentioned, hirings data are not available at regional 
data, which prevents us to proceed to a matching function 
analysis. Thus, we focus on the Italian Beveridge Curve.  
From Chapter I (Section 3) we recall that the matching function 
is increasing in both its arguments, concave and homogeneous 
of degree one (constant returns to scale):  
(6)                                         
                                                                                                         
          
where e captures the effectiveness of the search intensity of 
both firms and workers in creating new job matches and can be 
influenced by structural changes in the labour market (labour 
force reallocation). Thus, the efficiency term is interpreted as a 
mismatch indicator and reflects both shocks (causing 
occupational, sectoral, skill and regional mismatch between 
unemployed and vacancies) and labour market institutions.  
Starting from the matching function, we can obtain the 
Beveridge Curve and the efficiency term does not lose its 
original meaning. 
The evolution of total employment is given by the sum of the 
flows of new jobs created and existing jobs maintained: 




In terms of unemployment, 
(8)                                                                                                          
where         is the flow of employees moving into 
unemployment with rate s (inflow rate), and          is the 
flow of unemployed finding new jobs with probability       . 
In a steady state, as the mean rate of unemployment is constant, 
the matching function can be restated in order to obtain the 
Beveridge Curve. Actually, if the mean rate of unemployment 
is constant, we can write: 
(9)                                                 
We can rewrite (9) as an equation determining unemployment 
in terms of both transition rates, s and      : 
(10)                                      
          
.                                                                              
By the properties of the matching function, the flow 
equilibrium condition (10) can be represented in vacancy-
unemployment space by a downward-sloping and convex to the 
origin curve, the Beveridge Curve.  
More precisely, under the hypothesis of constant returns to 
scale, equation  
(11)                                                           
becomes 
(12)                                      
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In a steady state with constant rate of unemployment, the hiring 
rate (Hit /Nit-1) is equal to s + g, where s is the separation rate 
and g is the rate of growth in the labour force, L. Hence (13) 
becomes an inverse relationship between the unemployment 
and the vacancy rates, the Beveridge Curve, whose position 
depends on s, g, and eit. The interpretation of the last term does 
not change vis-à-vis (11); however, empirical measures of 
efficiency will reflect the evolution not only of eit, but also of s 
and g.  
The following specification  
(14)                                          
                                                                    
                                                     
  
                        
       
         
is used to estimate the Italian Beveridge Curve: i = 1, …, N 
stands for the region, and t = 1, …, T stands for the time period 
(quarter).     is the natural log of the unemployment rate,      is 
the vacancy rate,        and       are averages of the 
unemployment and vacancies in the neighbouring regions 
respectively,         and         gender and sectoral mismatch 
indicators respectively,           the share of employment in 




employment on labour force respectively,   a time trend (to 
allow for a more flexible specification of time-related structural 
changes, we include in the equation powers of this trend up to 
the fourth),    regional fixed effects and     a stochastic 
variable assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed and  , and   are the parameters of the model12. All 
the regressors, except for the lags of the unemployment rate 
and of the shares of temporary and part-time employment, are 
expressed through (one-period lagged) moving averages over 
four quarters.  
The main data source used is the quarterly Labour Force 
Survey from ISTAT (various years) (Indagine trimestrale sulle 
forze di lavoro). This survey involves every quarter about 
200,000 persons in 1,400 municipalities from all over the 
country. In particular, individual data from 1992:4 to 2009:3 
are used to measure stocks of unemployed and labour force for 
the twenty Italian regions.  
Moreover, we rely on the ISAE indicator of labour scarcity
13
 in 
order to measure regional vacancy rates, as it is available for all 
the Italian regions, unlike the ISFOL help-wanted ads. More 
 
12 Given that the empirical analysis of Chapter II reveals a statistically and 
economically significant role for technological progress and, to some extent, capital 
deepening in the labour matching process, it may be asked why no such variable is 
included in (14). The (all too obvious) answer is the lack of appropriate regional 
data. This variable omission is likely to be mitigated, anyway, by the inclusion of a 
quartic function of time in (14).  
13 We are very grateful to Dr. Marco Malgarini (ISAE) for making data on labour 






precisely, we used the transformation of the ISAE indicator 
suggested in Sestito (1991): 
(15)                                                  , 
where π is the percentage of firms reporting that the scarcity of 
labour does not prevent them from expanding their activity, 
   (   is the inverse of a standardized normal distribution 
function, and      is a standardized normal density function. 
Hence G(ISAE) is a monotonic transformation of the 
percentage of firms constrained by the scarcity of labour, 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms are normally 
distributed across constrained and non-constrained states. For 
that reason, in our estimates the coefficient of vacancy rate is 
positive, but the interpretation is the usual negative relationship 
between unemployment and vacancies.  
Note that in (14) we model spillover effects through the 
(unweighted) mean unemployment and vacancy rates of the 
neighbouring regions. We do not have data for commuter and 
migration flows that would allow a more sophisticated 
specification, and as Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003) we assume 
that relying on averages of neighbouring regions is appropriate 
for the NUT2 territorial level of our analysis. 
As regards mismatch indicators, in order to obtain values 
varying across both regions and quarters according to the data 
availability, we used M3 as gender mismatch indicator, and M1 




region j at time t. Following the evidence from Brandolini and 
Cipollone (2001) and Destefanis and Fonseca (2007), we 
include in our specification some indicators for the so-called 
atypical labour contracts, whose development is widely thought 
to be one of the main changes in the Italian labour market in 
recent years. However, the Confinterim data for temporary 
workers used by Destefanis and Fonseca are no longer 
available to the public, and we must use the Istat data for 
temporary and part-time employment, only available for four 
macroareas (North-West, North-East, Centre and South). Thus, 
shares of temporary (or part-time) employment on labour force 
for each region are derived dividing the temporary (or part-
time) employment of the macroarea a region belongs to by the 
labour force of that macroarea (the evolution of these shares is 
depicted in Figures A.1 and A.2). Unlike Destefanis and 
Fonseca (2004, 2007), we do not consider the difference 
between skilled and unskilled workers due to the lack of 
microdata concerning these two categories. 
Finally, we consider Piemonte and Val d‟Aosta jointly, as 
ISAE treats them as a single region in collecting data about 
labour scarcity indicator, and exclude Sardegna from the 
sample because of the lack of neighbouring regions, which 
prevents us to investigate reasonably spillover effects. Thus, 





3.6. The Estimates 
Building upon the suggestions of Judson and Owen (1999) for 
our type of sample (see Chapter II, Section 6), we proceed to 
the estimation of the model (14) through a simple fixed-effects 
LSDV procedure. Although our panel is balanced, we prefer 
LSDV to Kiviet's LSDVC because of the complexity of the 
dynamic specification of our model.  
Two different specifications are estimated, one excluding and 
one including mismatch indicators and spillover effects. The 
two specifications are respectively labelled (1) and (2) in the 
tables of the Appendix. 
We first focus on the period up to 2007 and then consider also 
the last two years, in order to better appraise the impact of the 
Great Recession on the Beveridge Curve.  
Table A.1 shows that the spillover effects have a very 
significant impact on the Beveridge Curve: an increase of the 
average unemployment rate of the neighbouring regions has a 
negative effect on efficiency and shifts the Curve outwards, 
which indicates increased competition in job search, whereas 
an increase of the average vacancy rate has a positive impact 
on efficiency and shifts the Curve inwards, reflecting more job 
opportunities for the unemployed. Furthermore, the inclusion 
of the spillover effects reduces coefficients and significance of 




the average vacancy rate of the neighbouring regions is even 
higher than the coefficient of the vacancy rate. This evidence is 
largely consistent with the results of Ilmakunnas and Pesola 
(2003). Other significant determinants of matching efficiency 
are the share of employment in industry (positive sign) and 
part-time employment (negative sign), whereas mismatch 
indicators and temporary employment appear not to have a 
significant impact on the Beveridge Curve. Among atypical 
labour contracts, only part-time thus seems to (favourably) 
affect labour market matching. Further evidence on this point 
must however wait for the production by ISTAT of genuinely 
regional measures for these indicators. 
In Table A.2, we consider the whole sample, introducing in 
both specifications two dummy variables (cr08, cr09) which 
capture the effects of the Great Recession in each year. The 
results of Table A.1 are confirmed, but the impact of the Great 
Recession on the Curve turns out to be very strong, especially 
in 2009. On the other hand, a dummy allowing for the (rather 
severe) recession of the early 1990's is not significant at all. 
These results are confirmed also in Table A.3, which shows a 
specification including spillovers and dummy variables 
capturing the effects of the Great Recession in each year and in 
each region. We can notice that Friuli Venezia Giulia and 




even in 2008, but in the following year dummies‟ coefficients 
get much higher in almost all Italian regions.  
However, some specification problems are highlighted from 
Ramsey‟s Regression Error Specification Tests, likely due to 
the territorial disaggregation of our dataset and to the choice of 
the variables which proxy the spillover effects. Arguably, the 
strong spillover effects we find are not appropriately 
represented through the simple contiguity approach that was 
pursued here. 
This hunch finds some confirmation as we proceed, like in 
Destefanis and Fonseca (2007), to estimation for the four 
macroareas (North-West, North-East, Centre and South) - 
instead of regions - excluding all spillover effects, which were 
found to be insignificant for this kind of territorial aggregation. 
The results are shown in Tables A.4, A.5 and A.6: RESET 
Tests indicate that the specification of the model improves very 
much, even though regressors generally lose significance.  
Resorting to (labour-force) weighted means for neighbouring 
vacancies and unemployment did not improve matters 
appreciably.  Spillovers were always strongly significant (the 
relevant estimates are available upon request), but so was the 
RESET Test. We lack, on the other hand, data for commuter 
and migration flows that would allow a more sophisticated 
specification of spillovers. A more appropriate modelling of 




In any case, according to the exploratory analyses about the 
impact of the Great Recession on the matching process that we 
presented in Chapter I, the current recession is unlikely to 
determine shifts of the Beveridge Curve in the European and 
US labour markets. The evidence we gather from our estimates 
does not afford much room for such optimism, at least for Italy. 
A large shift in the Curve is found to have taken place in the 
last two years, for which there was no counterpart during the 
rather severe recession of the early 1990's
14
. As this is true both 
for specifications (1) and (2), this finding is not likely to be 
affected by specification of spillovers.  
Equally unlikely to be affected by specification issues is the 
absence of significance for gender and sectoral indicators
15
. To 
some extent, this reiterates the results for Italy in Brandolini 
and Cipollone (2001). Regional imbalances seem indeed to be 
the key source of mismatch in the Italian labour market.  
As a consequence of all this, it would be tempting to close this 
chapter by computing matching efficiency scores and building 
a regional mismatch indicator as in Destefanis and Fonseca 
(2004). We do not pursue this exercise, however: there are 
specification issues still open with our regional estimates. Also, 
we lack the regional data for the separation rates required for 
 
14 It is however true that a full comparison of the two recessions would very much 
gain from having more observations in the early 1990's. 
15 These indicators are always grossly insignificant, also in a specification including 
them, but not the spillovers (for the sake of parsimony, these results are not reported 




the proper identification of the efficiency terms from our 
estimates. 
 
3.7. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we considered - for the first time, to the best of 
our knowledge - a Beveridge Curve for the twenty Italian 
administrative regions
16
. Particular attention is paid to appraise 
the relevance of mismatch, spillover effects and the current 
Great Recession for the regional labour matching process. 
Using a standard LSDV estimation approach, we find the 
following main results: a) we find no evidence that either 
gender or sectoral mismatch bring about shifts in the territorial 
Curves; b) on the other hand, spillover effects are very strong, 
although further research on their proper specification must be 
yet carried out; c) the Great Recession has a very strong 
(negative) impact upon the territorial Curves; d) finally, we 
find some tentative evidence that part-time jobs (but not 







16 As we have seen in the text, estimation must be restricted to eighteen regional data 


































































Legend of regions 
Piemonte-Val d'Aosta 01 
Lombardia 02 
Liguria 03 
Trentino Alto Adige 04 
Veneto 05 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 06 





























Legend of tables 
The sample relates to 1992:4-2009:3 period and 18 regions, for 
a sum total of 1224 observations.  
The dependent variable in all estimates is    , the natural log of 
the unemployment rate, where i = 1, …, N stands for the region 
or the macroarea, and t = 1, …, T stands for a given quarter.  
Among the independent variables, v is the vacancy rate, nu and 
nv are labour force unweighted averages of the unemployment 
and vacancies in the neighbouring regions respectively, gm and 
sm are gender and sectoral mismatch indicators respectively, 
ish the share of employment in industry, temp and partt shares 
of temporary and part-time employment on labour force 
respectively. All the independent variables, except for the lags 
of the unemployment rate and of the shares of temporary and 
part-time employment, are expressed through the (one-period 
lagged) moving averages of four quarters. P-values are in 
brackets.  
Variables are not deseasonalised. Seasonal dummies - not 
shown in the interest of parsimony – are always significant. 
In the model we have also included regional fixed effects and 
linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic trends, not shown in the 
interest of parsimony.  
AB(1) and AB(2) are the Arellano–Bond tests for first and 
































Table A.1. LSDV estimation, 1992:4-2007:4, regions 






























cons 1.147 (0.01) 0.608 (0.062) 
uit-1 0.157 (0.03) 0.135 (0.022) 
uit-2 -0.080 (0.024) -0.113 (0.011) 
uit-4 0.219 (0.002) 0.190 (0.010) 
vit-1 0.087 (0.011) 0.056 (0.045) 
nuit-4   0.152 (0.025) 
nvit-1   0.160 (0.020) 
gmit-1   -0.001(0.630) 
smit-1   -0.000 (0.992) 
ishit-1 0.15 (0.006) 0.017 (0.001) 
parttit-1 -0.037 (0.001) -0.30 (0.005) 
tempit-1 -0.002 (0.907) -0.001 (0.911) 
cr93 0.54 (0.129)   
AR (1) (P-value) 0.670 0.540 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.421 0.550 




Table A.2. LSDV estimation, 1992:4-2009:3, regions 


























  (1) (2) 
Cons 1.139 (0.000) 0.898 (0.001) 
uit-1 0.186 (0.000) 0.171 (0.003) 
uit-2 -0.017 (0.572) -0.044 (0.256) 
uit-4 0.197 (0.001) 0.175 (0.003) 
vit-1 0.092 (0.003) 0.065 (0.024) 
nuit-4   0.117 (0.032) 
nvit-1   0.167 (0.025) 
gmit-1   -0.001(0.621) 
smit-1   -0.003 (0.711) 
ishit-1 0.010 (0.029) 0.011(0.032) 
parttit-1 -0.039 (0.002) -0.033 (0.004) 
tempit-1 -0.015 (0.243) -0.014 (0.237) 
cr93 0.016 (0.624)   
cr08 0.157 (0.000) 0.180 (0.000) 
cr09 0.297 (0.000) 0.296 (0.000) 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.485 0.381 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.938 0.916 




Table A.3. LSDV estimation, 1992:4-2009:3, regions, Great 
Recession regional dummies (dependent variable: natural 
log of current unemployment) 
  (1) (2) 
cons  1.386 (0.000) 0.884 (0.001) 
uit-1  0.157 (0.002) 0.143 (0.011) 
uit-2  -0.021 (0.516) -0.051 (0.224) 
uit-4  0.205 (0.000) 0.181 (0.003) 
vit-1  0.092 (0.004) 0.064 (0.043) 
nuit-4   0.121 (0.032) 
nvit-1   0.168 (0.036) 
gmit-1   -0.001 (0.589) 
smit-1   -0.002 (0.841) 
ishit-1  0.012 (0.012) 0.014 (0.004) 
parttit-1  -0.043 (0.002) -0.036 (0.004) 
tempit-1  -0.012 (0.319) -0.012 (0.306) 
cr0801  0.163 (0.000) 0.178 (0.000) 
cr0802  0.092 (0.000) 0.106 (0.000) 
cr0803  0.142 (0.000) 0.169 (0.000) 
cr0804  0.201 (0.000) 0.275 (0.000) 
cr0805  0.011 (0.642) 0.022 (0.388) 
cr0806  0.466 (0.000) 0.505 (0.000) 
cr0807  0.133 (0.000) 0.144 (0.000) 
cr0808  0.220 (0.000) 0.251 (0.000) 
cr0809  0.143 (0.000) 0.164 (0.000) 
cr0810  0.066 (0.002) 0.094 (0.001) 
cr0811  0.187 (0.000) 0.219 (0.000) 
cr0812  0.213 (0.000) 0.227 (0.000) 
cr0813  0.088 (0.000) 0.129 (0.000) 
cr0814  0.336 (0.000) 0.363 (0.000) 
cr0815  0.195 (0.000) 0.222 (0.000) 
cr0816  0.132 (0.000) 0.124 (0.000) 
cr0817  -0.005 (0.000) 0.021 (0.719) 
cr0818  0.088 (0.000) 0.077 (0.000) 
cr0901  0.295 (0.000) 0.206 (0.000) 
cr0902  0.356 (0.000) 0.340 (0.000) 
cr0903  0.069 (0.227) 0.072 (0.278) 
cr0904  0.324 (0.000) 0.382 (0.000) 
cr0905  0.279 (0.000) 0.214 (0.000) 
cr0906  0.712 (0.000) 0.749 (0.000) 
cr0907  0.580 (0.000) 0.577 (0.000) 
cr0908  0.489 (0.000) 0.521 (0.000) 
cr0909  0.289 (0.000) 0.266 (0.000) 
cr0910  0.406 (0.000) 0.426 (0.000) 
cr0911  0.215 (0.000) 0.221 (0.000) 
cr0912  0.300 (0.000) 0.289 (0.000) 
cr0913  0.344 (0.000) 0.359 (0.000) 
cr0914  0.498 (0.000) 0.540 (0.000) 
cr0915  0.380 (0.000) 0.379 (0.000) 
cr0916  0.109 (0.015) 0.051 (0.297) 
cr0917  -0.138 (0.000) -0.132 (0.000) 
cr0918  0.027 (0.569) 0.010 (0.813) 
AR (1) (P-value)  0.281 0.199 
AR (2) (P-value)  0.610 0.533 




Table A.4. LSDV estimation, 1992:4-2007:4, areas 
(dependent variable: natural log of current unemployment) 
 
cons 1.490 (0.191) 
uit-1 0.098 (0.387) 
uit-2 -0.190 (0.079) 
uit-4 0.141 (0.294) 
vit-1 0.249 (0.049) 
gmit-1 0.000 (0.907) 
smit-1 -0.044 (0.235) 
ishit-1 0.879 (0.797) 
parttit-1 -0.022 (0.078) 
tempit-1 0.013 (0.555) 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.327 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.608 



















Table A.5. LSDV estimation, 1992:4-2009:3, areas 


























cons 1.660 (0.005) 
uit-1 0.168 (0.131) 
uit-2 -0.048 (0.717) 
uit-4 0.164 (0.240) 
vit-1 0.208 (0.103) 
gmit-1 -0.002 (0.326) 
smit-1 -0.030 (0.523) 
ishit-1 -0.002 (0.929) 
parttit-1 -0.024 (0.104) 
tempit-1 -0.007 (0.772) 
cr08 0.208 (0.053) 
cr09 0.363 (0.091) 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.082 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.732 




Table A.6. LSDV estimation, 1992:4-2009:3, areas, Great 
Recession territorial dummies (dependent variable: natural 
log of current unemployment) 
 
cons 1.535 (0.052) 
uit-1 0.154 (0.154) 
uit-2 -0.067 (0.638) 
uit-4 0.177 (0.207) 
vit-1 0.242 (0.066) 
gmit-1 -0.001 (0.582) 
smit-1 -0.041 (0.432) 
ishit-1 0.001 (0.969) 
parttit-1 -0.028 (0.041) 
tempit-1 -0.001 (0.948) 
cr081 0.153 (0.013) 
cr082 0.355 (0.003) 
cr083 0.148 (0.053) 
cr084 0.204 (0.006) 
cr091 0.131 (0.139) 
cr092 0.618 (0.002) 
cr093 0.441 (0.004) 
cr094 0.300 (0.001) 
AR (1) (P-value) 0.062 
AR (2) (P-value) 0.539 
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